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SUMMARY
Despite a general harmonization of international arbitration law and arbitral procedure, there is no 
international consensus on how the applicable substantive law in arbitration should be ascertained and 
applied. In Swedish law, this issue – often discussed in terms of whether jura novit curia applies to 
international arbitration or not – is uncertain. This thesis makes a comparative analysis of English, 
French, Swedish and Swiss law in order to recommend a solution to this uncertainty.
In national courts, two basic approaches exist in how to ascertain and apply  the substantive law. In 
civil law jurisdictions, the judge is generally  obliged to research the law and apply  the correct legal 
basis ex officio under the legal maxim jura novit curia. This is the case in Sweden, France and 
Switzerland. The freedom of the judge to apply the law ex officio is however limited to some extent by 
the parties’ right of disposition and right to be heard. In common law jurisdictions, the parties are 
generally  responsible for researching the law and presenting legal arguments. Under the adversarial 
principle, the judge must refrain from conducting legal research and from raising legal issues ex 
officio. Such is the case, for example, in England. When foreign law is applied in national courts, 
however, the differences between the common and civil law jurisdictions appear less drastic. In 
England as well as in France, Sweden and Switzerland, it  is generally the parties who are responsible 
for ascertaining the content of the applicable foreign law. Yet, in Sweden and France, the court still has 
a secondary responsibility for ascertaining the content of foreign law. 
In international arbitration, the arbitral tribunal generally enjoys considerable liberty in ascertaining 
and applying the applicable substantive law. Rules applied in national courts are rarely imposed in 
international arbitral procedure. In Sweden, however, this issue is uncertain. In England, France and 
Switzerland, at least two factors are common: (1) the parties are generally responsible for ascertaining 
the content of the applicable substantive law, and (2) the arbitral tribunal enjoys a discretionary power 
to research the law and raise legal issues ex officio, this authority is limited by the parties’ right to be 
heard on points of law. The underlying principle is that the arbitral tribunal may not take the parties by 
surprise when it applies the law; the parties must be afforded an opportunity  to comment if the arbitral 
tribunal considers application of legal rules, principles, sources or arguments, to which the parties have 
not referred. This deference to a discretionary  power of the arbitral tribunal and the parties’ right to be 
heard on points of law is also supported in other key sources of international arbitration law.
This thesis suggests that  the principles based on commonalities in the examined jurisdictions should 
also be applied in international arbitral procedure in Sweden. Consequently, jura novit curia, as it is 
understood in Swedish civil litigation, should not be applied in international commercial arbitration.
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1. INTRODUCTION
”I remember a deliberation many years ago. One of my coarbitrators,  a Canadian, suggested dismissing a 
claim because – he said – ”they have not proven the law”. I was young and inexperienced, and surprised: 
”But they do not have to prove the law”, I replied. And that is when I realized that we were working on very 
different assumptions.”1
This thesis addresses the issue of how to ascertain and apply the law in international commercial 
arbitration, an area where, by its very nature, different legal cultures must coexist.
1.1 General Background
Today, arbitration is the most common form of dispute resolution in international transactions and 
international commercial relationships.2  The reason for its success is generally  attributed to a number 
of advantages that arbitration has over litigation in national courts.3  Arbitration is often described as 
cheaper and faster than national court proceedings. Furthermore, arbitration is perceived as neutral, 
giving neither party  the advantage of proceedings in their ”home” court. Arbitration is perceived as 
being of a more confidential nature, and the arbitral award is generally easier to enforce than a foreign 
court order. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the principle of party  autonomy in international 
arbitration makes the arbitration procedure supple and flexible, and leaves substantial liberty  to the 
parties in the choice of arbitrators, language, seat location, applicable substantive law, etc.4 
Over the last few decades, international arbitration law has been subject to two parallel – and partially 
contradictory – developments: internationalization and national profiling. In 1958, the New York 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention) 
entered intro force. This may be considered the starting point in a process of internationalization of 
arbitration law, followed by  the United Nations Commission of International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
1985 Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, which has been of great  importance in the 
process of harmonization national arbitration laws.5 
Despite the success of instruments like the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law, 
arbitration law is still far from complete harmonization. For example, the New York Convention 
assumes that an arbitral award is pronounced according to the national arbitration law of a particular 
6
1 Kaufman-Kohler (ASA Special Series 2006) p. 79.
2  Fouchard,  Gaillard & Goldman (1999) p. 1 and Petrochilos (2004) p.1. An extensive international survey from 2006 
analyzing corporate attitudes shows that 73% of the respondents prefer to use international arbitration rather than dispute 
resolution in national courts: Queen Mary & PWC Survey (2006).
3 Other factors that have accelerated the development of arbitration as the most important form of international commercial 
dispute resolution over the last few decades are the underlying prosperity of international commerce and trade, the 
developments in communication – which in turn have led to demands of faster dispute resolution – and the more and more 
globalized world.
4  See e.g. Born (2001) p. 7 et seq.,  Fouchard, Gaillard & Goldman (1999) p.  1 et seq., Heuman (1999) p. 27 et seq., 
Lindskog (2005) p. 46, Madsen (2007) p. 23 et seq., Tweeddale & Tweeddale (2005) p. 39 et seq.
5 SOU 1994:81 p. 61–63.
state.6  Thus, awards claiming to be a-national or denationalized, risk being refused enforcement. 
Arbitration must therefore be sanctioned by a national legal system in order to be binding and 
enforceable.7
During the decades of internationalization, arbitration also experienced a unprecedented boom in 
lawmaking.8  Although many national arbitration laws were inspired by the UNCITRAL Model Law, 
the arbitration laws in some countries – particularly  European countries, e.g. Sweden, France, 
Switzerland, England and Spain – were largely influenced by national legal culture and traditions.9 
Several other factors also curbed the process of internationalization of arbitration law. First, identical 
or similar rules were interpreted differently in different jurisdictions, the division being particularly 
distinct between civil law and common law jurisdictions. Second, the importance of party  autonomy 
varied between different jurisdictions, resulting in variations as to the extent  to which the parties were 
free to form the arbitration themselves. Third, as in all other legal areas, new concepts and ideas arose 
within arbitration law. Such ideas are often recognized in only a minority of the legal systems world 
wide, naturally leading to further variances in the law of international arbitration.10
Significantly, arbitration is also one of the areas of law that has been left outside of the European 
Union harmonization initiatives.11  In summary, although arbitration law has been subject to an 
important – and in many  aspects successful – process of harmonization and internationalization, 
differences still exist between the arbitration laws of different jurisdictions.
1.2 Problems concerning the ascertainment and application of the applicable law in international 
arbitration
One topic that continues to divide legal scholars and arbitration practitioners – and which, at least until 
recently, has received a relatively  small amount of attention in legal literature12 – is the issue of how to 
ascertain and apply  the law in international arbitration. The issue concerns the question whether jura 
7
6 New York Convention, Art. 1. The Convention speaks of awards made in the territory of a state. See also SOU 1994:81 p. 
62.
7 See e.g. SOU 1994:81 p. 58–60 and Fouchard, Gaillard & Goldman (1999) p. 3.
8 Berger (1993) p 1.
9 SOU 1994:81 p. 64.
10 Fouchard, Gaillard & Goldman (1999) p. 2.
11  Pålsson (2010) p. 68 et seq. Arbitration and judicial proceedings in connection with arbitration are excluded from the 
application of the Brussels I Regulation and the Brussels and Lugano Conventions. See Council Regulation (EC) No 
44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters, Art. 1(2)(d), Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, Art. 1(2)(4), Convention of 30 October 2007 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters, Art.  1(2)(d) and Marc Rich and Co AG v Società Italiana Impianti PA [1991] 
ECR I– 3855.
12 Lew (2011) p. 2 and ILA Report (2008) p. 4.
novit curia13 applies to international arbitration, or , seen from a different perspective, if the applicable 
substantive law has the status of fact or law.14
From the point of view of national courts there are two basic approaches to this issue in civil 
litigation.15  Jurisdictions from both common and the civil law legal tradition are generally  in 
agreement that facts must be pleaded and proved by the parties, and that these facts set the limits for 
what the court  may rule on.16  However, when it comes to the status of applicable law, particularly 
foreign law, common and civil law legal traditions diverge. Common law countries are more prone to 
treat foreign law as fact to be proven by the parties, also forbidding the judges to go outside the 
parties’ legal arguments. By contrast, civil law countries generally treat foreign law as law. Civil law 
judges might therefore be obliged to establish and apply  the content of the applicable law ex officio, 
and they may be at greater liberty to raise new legal issues.17
As there is no lex fori in international arbitration, one might say that all law is foreign. And as the 
principle of party autonomy grants the parties the liberty – regardless of where the arbitration takes 
place – to decide the applicable law, a wide spectrum of different laws are applied in international 
arbitration proceedings.18  Once again, in the words of the well-known professor and practicing 
arbitrator Kaufman-Kohler:
 
”Reflecting back on the cases in which I have been involved as an arbitrator, and certainly forgetting some of 
them, I realize that I have resolved disputes under German, French, English, Polish, Hungarian, Portuguese, 
Greek, Turkish,  Lebanese, Egyptian, Tunisian, Moroccan, Sudanese, Liberian, Korean, Thai,  Argentinean, 
Colombian, Venezuelan, Illinois, New York... and Swiss law.”19
Statistics from the ICC International Court of Arbitration provide that out of 817 cases handled over 
one year, 91 different laws or legal systems were applied.20 46 percent of the cases handled by the SCC 
Institute of arbitration in 2010 were international cases.21  The issue of how to ascertain the content of 
the applicable law is therefore of great practical importance. 
8
13 Some authors also refer to the principle as iura novit curia.
14 See Poudret & Besson (2007) p. 475 and 803. See also e.g. Lew (2011) p. 1, Madsen (JT 2010/11) p. 486 and Kaufman-
Kohler (Arb. Int’l 2005) p. 631 et seq.
15  This is of course an over simplification. In reality both civil and common law countries are situated on a sliding scale 
somewhere in between the to extremes.
16  ILA Report (2008) p. 2. For Swedish law, see the Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure – Rättegångsbalk (1942:740) – 
chapter 17 section 3 and chapter 35 section 6.
17 See e.g. Lew, Mistelis & Kröll (2003) pp. 441–442 and Hartley (ICLQ 1996) pp. 291–292.
18 Lew (2011) p 2.
19 Kaufmann–Kohler (Arb. Int’l 2005) p. 631.
20 ICC Report (2010) p. 12.
21 SCC Report (2010).
In order to fulfill his or her22  mandate – to resolve the dispute on the basis of the applicable law – the 
arbitrator undeniably needs some knowledge of the applicable law. Yet, in the process of acquiring this 
knowledge the arbitrator must know how to conduct himself so as to avoid the risk of challenge 
actions for excess of authority or procedural irregularities.23  So, how should the arbitrator proceed? 
Should he apply  the same method as the national courts, or do considerations specific to arbitration 
require a unique solution? May  the arbitrator conduct his own legal research? How should he interact 
with the parties? How should he apply the law once it is ascertained? Is he free to apply a legal 
provision differently than argued for by the parties? May he apply a legal basis ex officio? 
These questions touch on the underlying issue of the very role of the arbitrator: does the arbitrator only 
have obligations towards the parties or must other interests – such as public policy or an obligation to 
resolve the dispute according to law – be taken into consideration?
From the parties’ point of view, it  is important to know whether the applicable rules must be invoked 
and proved or if one might, so to speak, relax and let the tribunal do the work.
1.2.1 A Swedish perspective
Sweden plays an important role in international arbitration. During the cold war, Stockholm was often 
chosen as the seat for arbitration between China or Soviet states and western parties. The importance 
of Sweden’s role in arbitration survived the cold war and today Stockholm is the seat of numerous 
arbitrations where neither the parties, nor the object  of the dispute has any connection to Sweden or 
Swedish law.24
In choosing the seat of the arbitral proceedings, the parties must know which procedural rules will 
govern the arbitration dispute.25  Legal considerations, affecting the arbitral procedure, are pointed out 
as comprising the single most important factor in the choice of the place of the arbitration.26  National 
peculiarities, which may have an impact on the procedure and possibly affect the outcome of the 
dispute, are therefore an important variable in the choice of the arbitral seat:
”Such differences are a frequent source of concern in international arbitration, where at least one of the 
parties is, and often both parties are, confronted with foreign and unfamiliar provisions and procedures. /.../ 
Uncertainty about the local law with the inherent risk of frustration may adversely affect the functioning of 
the arbitral process and also impact on the selection of the place of arbitration. Due to such uncertainty, a 
9
22 In the following, only he or his will be used when referring to he or she or his or hers in order to make the text easier to 
read.
23 Lew (2011) p 2.
24 See Fouchard, Gaillard & Goldman (1999) p. 79–80 and SOU 1994:81 p. 65.
25 Redfern & Hunter (2004) p. 83.
26 Queen Mary & PWC Survey (2006) pp. 13-14.
party may hesitate or refuse to agree to a place, which for practical reasons would otherwise be 
appropriate.”27
The conditions for a well-functioning arbitral jurisdiction have been identified as: a high degree of 
respect by local courts for the autonomy of the arbitral process, the maximum efficiency of awards and 
law, and finally, a practice creating predictable arbitral proceedings.28
In an age where states around the world compete to be an attractive alternative for international 
commercial dispute resolution,29  international arbitral procedure must reflect the needs and 
expectations of the ”consumers”, i.e. the parties. It is therefore important – for the sake of legal 
security and predictability – that the parties are aware of the procedural rules that govern the 
ascertainment of the applicable law. Such rules should also reflect  the principle of party autonomy and 
the fact that international commercial arbitration is a form of dispute resolution where actors from 
widely  different legal traditions and cultures meet.30  This is a necessary end-goal for Swedish 
arbitration law in order to uphold, and if possible fortify, Sweden’s role as an important player in 
international arbitration, an aim explicitly expressed by the legislator.31
1.3 Definition of Arbitration 
At this point, it may be suitable to provide a brief definition of arbitration, along with what types of 
arbitration disputes that are considered to be international.
Arbitration is a form of semi–private, semi–judicial dispute resolution where the parties to a contract 
agree to refer their disputes to a third party – an arbitral tribunal – instead of a national court. The 
arbitration is private in so far as it is based on the parties’ freedom of contract: the same issues that 
may be subject to a contract  between the parties may also be subject to arbitration. The arbitral award 
cannot be reviewed on its merits in a national court; it is not subject to appeal.32  The award may 
however be invalidated or set aside in subsequent court proceedings should certain serious formal or 
procedural irregularities have occurred.33  The binding force of the arbitral agreement between the 
parties, and a national court’s obligation to dismiss an action that falls under an arbitration agreement, 
flows from the principle of pacta sunt servanda.34  The judicial features of arbitration mainly  consist in 
properties that arbitral awards share with court orders: enforceability,35  legal force and res judicata 
effect.36
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27 Explanatory note on UNCITRAL model law, para. 8-9.
28 Magnusson (SAN 2/2004).
29 Berger (1993) p 1–5.
30 Fouchard, Gaillard & Goldman (1999) p. 3.
31 Gov’t Bill 1998/99:35 p. 42.
32 See e.g. Heuman (1999) p. 584. The parties may agree that the award may be reviewed on its merits on appealed in court 
or in an arbitral tribunal, such agreements are however highly unusual, see p. 40. 
33 SAA section 33 and 34. See also Heuman (1999) p. 585 et seq.
34 SOU 1994:81 p. 69 and Gov’t Bill 1998:99:35 p. 42.
35 SOU 1994:81 p. 67 and Gov’t Bill 1998:99:35 p. 40.
36 NJA 1998 p. 42.
1.3.1. Definition of international
There is no uniform definition of international arbitration; what defines a dispute as international 
varies in different jurisdictions. It  is also beyond the scope of this thesis to more profoundly address 
this complicated issue. However, a brief note on the concept of internationality  of arbitration disputes 
may be helpful to better understand the subject matter of this thesis.
Art. 1(3) of the UNCITRAL Model Law, which many national laws draw inspiration from, applies the 
following definition:
(a) the parties to an arbitration agreement have,  at the time of the conclusion of that agreement,  their places 
of business in different States; or
(b) one of the following places is situated outside the State in which the parties have their place of business:
(i) the place of arbitration if determined in, or pursuant to, the arbitration agreement;
(ii) any place where a substantial part of the obligations of the commercial relationship is to be 
performed or the place with which the subject matter of the dispute is most closely connected; or
(c) the parties have expressly agreed that the subject matter of the arbitration agreement relates to more than 
one country.
The Swedish Arbitration Act37 (SAA) applies to both domestic arbitration and, under section 46 of the 
SAA, to arbitration with an international connection. The international connection may consist of 
either party  being foreign, but also of the fact that the object  of the dispute relates to a foreign 
transaction or operation.38
1.4 Purpose and method
The main purpose of this thesis is to offer a recommendation on how the applicable law should be 
ascertained and applied in international arbitration in Sweden. The application of the maxim jura novit 
curia in international arbitration in Sweden will be discussed from the departure point of the problems 
and questions set out under 1.2. and in the light of a comparative analysis of principles governing the 
ascertainment and application of the law in the civil litigation and in the arbitration procedure in 
England, France Sweden and Switzerland. The methods used are legal dogmatic method combined 
with comparative method. 
In this context it  should be noted that there is a considerable difference between what an arbitrator 
must or must not do and what an arbitrator should or should not do. Due to the substantial liberty 
granted to the parties and arbitrators in international arbitration, much of what can be said on the topic 
concerns the latter issue.39
11
37 Lag (1999:116) om skiljeförfarande.
38 Madsen (2007) p. 37.
39 ILA Report (2008) p. 8.
The aim of the legal dogmatic method is to describe and interpret  the law. It should be pointed out that 
Swedish legal dogmatic method is less influenced by positivism and more influenced by legal realism 
the method in many other jurisdictions.40  The aim is often described as predicting how a court would 
rule on a specific issue, and the perspective is therefore that of a judge.41  The aim may be more 
precisely defined as giving an authoritative interpretation regarding the content of the law based on 
authoritative sources of law.42  Dealing with a legal issue that is uncertain, as this thesis does, the 
classic conception of the legal dogmatic method therefore encounters several problems. In modern 
jurisprudence, the aim in this situation is rather to recommend a solution to the legal unclarity.43
The aim of modern Swedish jurisprudence has been described as explaining, not only using the 
authoritative frame of the doctrine of sources of law, but also using e.g. policy, functional and 
teleological arguments, and to leave contributions on which rational decisions may be made.44  From 
this more modern perspective, the authoritative framework of the sources of law and the narrow task 
of predicting how a judge would rule on a given matter loses some of its importance.45  The legal 
sources, however, still form the basis of the legal arguments, but may be combined with arguments 
based on notions of predictability, rationality, purpose and values, where the law de lege lata is 
critically analyzed.46
As to international arbitration, its transnational character is a strong reason not to heavily  rely on the 
preparatory works and other domestic sources for interpreting the Swedish Arbitration Act (SAA).47  In 
international commercial arbitration, the legal research has a clear international focus and the 
international practice is of considerable importance.48  The preparatory  works themselves point  to the 
need for the Swedish arbitration legislation to adapt to international developments.49  A comparative 
and less formalistic approach is therefore crucial.50
When applying a comparative method, choices have to be made. The comparative analysis of this 
thesis will therefore be focused on jurisdictions with modern arbitration laws and well-established 
arbitral practice. England, Switzerland, France – the top  three seats of international commercial 
arbitration according to an extensive international survey 51  – and of course Sweden, will be the 
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40 Olsen (SvJT 2004) p. 109.
41 Ross (1953) p. 47 et seq.
42 Peczenik (1995) p. 260 et seq. and 314
43 Olsen (SvJT 2004) p. 116-117.
44 Hellner (2001) p. 33 et seq and 45 et seq.
45 Olsen (SvJT 2004) p. 113.
46 Sandgren (2006) p. 534-536.
47 Lindskog (2005) p. 22–23.
48 SOU 1994:81 p. 71.
49 Gov’t Bill 1998/99:35 p. 45.
50 SOU 1994:81 p. 74.
51 Queen Mary and PWC survey (2006) p. 13-14.
primary targets. The jurisdictions also represent different legal cultures. England has a common law 
legal system while France and Switzerland both have continental civil law systems. The study of two 
civil law jurisdictions and only  one common law jurisdiction is justified due to the fact that principles 
of civil procedure differ dramatically between civil law jurisdictions, whilst common law civil 
procedure is governed by similar principles to a higher degree.52 
Institutional arbitration rules, arbitral awards and arbitration soft law will also be analyzed. Due to the 
confidential nature of arbitral awards, their availability might be scarce. Awards from investment 
arbitration – which are more likely to be made public – might therefore be useful for consideration.53
The comparison of different jurisdictions always poses a certain problem: the author, as well as the 
reader, trained within the compounds of a single legal system, must understand the rules of other legal 
systems. Simply studying the details of the legal area of comparison may  often be misleading. 
Knowledge of the legal cultures of the jurisdictions subject to comparison might help  understanding 
the foreign law in question by putting the compared rules in context.54  Hopefully, analyzing the 
principles governing the ascertainment and application of law in national courts will facilitate an 
understanding of the corresponding principles applicable in arbitration. To this end, some general 
features of common and civil law civil procedure will also be described.
Regarding the use of sources in comparative studies, original and primary  sources from the countries 
subject to the study is not  a requirement. Secondary sources might even be more suitable when 
examining several jurisdictions within the context of a master thesis.55  My linguistic knowledge has 
however been criterion in the selection of jurisdictions for analysis, and I will therefore employ  both 
primary and secondary sources.
1.5 Delimitations
The focus of this thesis is the ascertainment and application of the substantive rules applicable to the 
contract – the lex contractus – that are applied to resolve the dispute before the arbitral tribunal. Thus, 
this thesis does not deal with the question of determining what rules apply; the choice of law and 
conflict of laws issues. 
When ascertaining and applying the lex contractus, special circumstances, like the procedural default 
of the defendant,56  public policy considerations57 or the application of interim relief proceedings may 
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52 See e.g. Reynold (Arb. Int’l 1989) p. 357
53  See e.g. Cordero Moss (SIAR 2006) p. 9 on the relevance of investment arbitration rules to international commercial 
arbitration.
54 Bogdan (2003) p. 44-48.
55 Bogdan (2003) pp. 41–43.
56 See e.g. arbitral award rendered in 2005 in SCC case 93/2004, SIAR 2006:3, edited by Jarvin, p. 102 et seq.
57 See below, subparagraph 3.1
rightfully affect the approach of the arbitral tribunal in ascertaining and applying the applicable law.58 
Proceedings under such special circumstances are also left outside the scope of this thesis.
Furthermore, this thesis is limited to international commercial arbitration, thereby excluding domestic 
arbitration, statutory arbitration, investment arbitration and interstate arbitration. 
Finally, the power of the arbitrators in aspects other than ascertaining and applying rules and laws, e.g. 
to order production of evidence or to inquire about facts, is also left outside the scope of this thesis, as 
well as the question of how the arbitral tribunal should interpret the applicable law.
1.6 Disposition
Section two contains a comparative study on how law is ascertained and applied in different national 
courts. Approaches to both lex fori – domestic law – and foreign law are included. The comparison 
will serve to highlight differences between legal cultures that have to be taken into account when 
shaping the international arbitral procedure. The comparison of how foreign law is treated in national 
courts will also serve to highlight the similarities and differences in approaches to ascertaining and 
applying a law that is unknown to the adjudicator.
Section three compares the arbitration laws of different jurisdictions and examines if, and to what 
extent, national legal traditions affect the procedural law of international commercial arbitration. In 
relation to the comparison of the procedure in national courts, this will serve to highlight similarities 
and differences in special considerations made in relation to arbitration in each jurisdiction. This 
comparison will, along with other sources of arbitration law, serve to examine possible uniformity of 
practice or common denominators in how the applicable law in international commercial arbitration is 
ascertained and applied.
Section four analyzes the result of the comparative outlook in the light of the principles governing 
arbitral procedure in Swedish law, taking into account the problems described in subparagraph 1.2, so 
as to, in section five, arrive at a recommendation on how the applicable law should be ascertained and 
applied in international arbitration in Sweden.
2. ASCERTAINING AND APPLYING THE LAW IN NATIONAL COURTS
In this section, the principles governing the ascertainment and application of lex fori and foreign law in 
national courts will be compared. The comparison will highlight similarities and differences between 
the different legal traditions, which must be taken into account in international arbitration proceedings. 
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It will also serve to analyze whether there may  be any uniform understanding of jura novit curia, and 
if not, what the different understandings of the principle includes. 
Understanding how the lex fori is ascertained and applied in the different legal systems will also help 
contextualize the rules on how to ascertain and apply foreign law and the applicable substantive law in 
arbitration. The rules on of how foreign law is ascertained reflect the considerations made when a 
national judge is faced with a body of law that is unknown to him. The relevance of these rules to 
international commercial arbitration proceedings will in turn be evaluated.
2.1 General features in common and civil law civil procedure 
How civil procedure, and its fundamental function, is viewed in a given legal system is reflected in the 
organization of the proceedings and the allocation of responsibilities and duties between the parties 
and the court is organized.59  When studying theories regarding the respective roles of the parties and 
the court, and the interaction between the two, proceedings are often described in terms of being more 
or less inquisitorial or adversarial.60 
In essence, inquisitorial proceedings refer to where the judge controls the case and its legal and factual 
frames. In adversarial proceedings, it is rather the parties who control the proceedings.61  Applied to 
questions of law, the adversarial principle signifies that the judge must stick to the rules, authorities 
and arguments presented by  the parties in resolving the dispute.62  The judge may not ”propose or 
adopt arguments or conclusions of law differing from those which the parties put forward”.63  The 
adversarial principle is closely connected to the principle of party control, ensuring that the court 
remains passive during the proceedings. Two common justifications for allowing the parties to control 
the legal limits of the proceedings are: ensuring that the court remains impartial, and preventing the 
court from falling into error.64 
The adversarial principle rests on the assumption that the parties are both represented and equal, and 
that issues of public interest  will seldom be raised in private disputes.65  The focus of an adversarial 
procedure is dispute resolution and procedural justice, as opposed to that of inquisitorial proceedings, 
which is rather substantive justice in accordance with the applicable substantive law.66
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59 Westberg (2010) p. 66 et seq.
60  In Swedish legal tradition, there is no generally accepted terminology, the terms dispositionsprincipen, 
förhandlingsprincipen and kontradiktionsprincipen,  are used when referring to the parties’ right and power to control the 
proceedings, rather than the term adversarial, which is commonly used in common law legal literature. See Westberg 
(2010) p.  66-67 or Ekelöf (1956) p. 245 et seq.  for the Swedish terminology and e.g. Jolowicz (ICLQ 2003) p. 281 et seq. 
and Andrews (1994) p. 33 et seq. for the English terminology.
61 Andrews (1994) p. 33-34. See also Ekelöf (1956) p. 252.
62 Andrews (1994) p. 33 et seq.
63 Lord Staughton (Arb. Int’l 1989) p. 352.
64 Andrews (1994) p. 34-35.
65 Andrews (1994) p. 34-35.
66 Jolowicz (ICLQ 2003) p. 281 et seq, especially p. 295.
In modern western society, every legal system considers its civil litigation to be adversarial – i.e. based 
on the principle of contradiction. However, from a common law perspective, common law civil 
procedure is generally described as more adversarial in nature, as opposed to continental civil law civil 
procedure, which generally is described as inquisitorial. Under civil law, the more active role of the 
judge is not considered as giving the proceedings an inquisitorial nature.67  Yet, in common law 
systems, this difference is often underscored as a major distinguishing element between common and 
civil law litigation. By contrast, Sweden belongs to the Scandinavian legal tradition, which civil 
procedure has been described as ”half cow - half goat”, i.e. containing both civil and common law 
elements.68  The character of Scandinavian civil procedure, although formally  classified as a civil law 
system, is often – also from a common law perspective – described as more adversarial in nature,69  at 
least with respect to the collection of facts and evidence.70  Whatever the terminology, it is clear that 
there is no system – neither common nor civil law – that is purely inquisitorial or adversarial.71
The extent to which the jurisdictions subject to comparison may be characterized as adversarial or 
inquisitorial falls outside the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, an understanding of the two principles, 
and their underlying motivations may be useful to contextualize rules and considerations with regard 
to international arbitration. The most relevant aspect is the distribution of duties and powers between 
the judge and the parties in relation to the ascertainment and application of the law, and not in relation 
to selection of facts and evidence
 
Under civil law civil procedure,72 the parties generally have no obligation to specify  any legal basis for 
their action. The court is instead expected to know the law, i.e. the judge is obliged to research and 
apply  the law to the facts presented by  the parties. This concept is expressed through the maxim jura 
novit curia. Nevertheless, the power of the civil law judge to apply the law ex officio is generally 
limited by procedural safeguards or principles that are designed to ensure procedural fairness.73 
Unsurprisingly, civil law judges are generally required to have legal training.74 
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67 Westberg (2010) p. 80 et seq.
68 Westberg (Bogdan 2010) p. 210 et seq.
69 See e.g. Redfern & Hunter (2004) p. 320
70 Westberg (2010) p. 66 et seq.
71 Andrews (1994) p. 33-34.
72  It should also be pointed out that civil law civil procedure may differ dramatically from jurisdiction to jurisdiction: 
”(T)here is no such thing as ‘Civil Law procedure’ in civil and commercial litigation. In Common Law countries, there are 
undoubtedly certain common basic principles of procedure, which go back to the procedure practised in the English 
Courts. In continental Europe, there is no such common origin. In each country, one finds a different blend of civil 
procedure, largely influenced by local custom /.../. There is possibly as much difference between the outlook and practices 
of a French avocat and of a German Rechtsanwalt as between those of an English and of an Italian lawyer”. See Reynold 
(Arb. Int’l 1989) p. 357. 
73 Geeroms (2003) p. 34 et seq.
74 Geeroms (2003) p. 30.
Turning again to common law, only in exceptional cases should a common law judge raise a legal 
issue ex officio. Furthermore, common law judges are not expected to know the law and need no legal 
training. Instead, it is the parties who have a duty to invoke, research and present the applicable law, 
even where the law is unfavorable to the party presenting it.75
With this general description of differences between civil and common law we turn to the specific 
jurisdictions subject to comparison. For each jurisdiction, the way that both lex fori and foreign law is 
ascertained is studied. Considerations made in relation to foreign law is of particular interest due to the 
considerations involved when the judge of a national court must depart from the safe grounds of his lex 
fori to apply a law with which he may be unfamiliar. This creates several practical problems that in 
many ways are common to international commercial arbitration. First, how is the foreign law 
introduced? Must the foreign law be invoked or should the court apply it ex officio. Second, how 
should the content of the applicable law be ascertained and applied? These are the issues that national 
rules generally have tried to resolve.76  For the purpose of this thesis, it is the mainly the second issue – 
how the foreign law is dealt with once it is introduced – that is of relevance.
2.2 Sweden
After over 450 years of statutory existence, the principle jura novit curia has deep roots in Swedish 
legal tradition.77  In modern procedural law, the principle’s main raison d’être seems to be the will to 
produce precedents and a uniform application of the law, as well as considerations of protecting a party 
that fails to invoke a certain legal provision.78
Although the principle itself has not been enacted in statute, it finds statutory expression in Chapter 35 
Section 2 of the Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure79  (SCJP), which states that the parties need not 
prove what the law prescribes. In civil procedure, the principle obliges the judge to know the content 
of the law. Or rather, it obliges the judge to make use of his own knowledge of the law or to conduct 
his own legal research in order to ascertain its content.80  The parties have no obligation whatsoever to 
invoke or refer to any legal provisions, but will generally do so.81
The other important consequence of the principle is that  the court is obliged to apply legal provisions 
ex officio, i.e. to apply  legal provisions to which neither party has made reference and subsume the 
facts invoked by the parties under such legal provisions.82 Even if both parties have expressly  opposed 
17
75 Geeroms (2003) pp. 23-25.
76 Geeroms (2003) p 41 et seq and p. 91 et seq.
77 Kurkela (ASA Bulletin 2003) p. 486.
78 Lappalainen (JFT 1993) p. 42. 
79 Rättegångsbalk (1942:740).
80 Ekelöf, Edelstam & Heuman (2009) p. 303.
81 Kleineman (2009) p. 93.
82 Ekelöf & Boman (1996) p. 128. See also e.g. NJA 1989 p. 614, NJA 1993 p. 13 , NJA 1996 p. 663 and NJA 1999 p. 629.
the application of a certain rule, the court  is generally  free to apply and resolve the dispute on the basis 
of such a rule. This concept is sometimes expressed by saying that the application of the law is 
excluded from the parties right of disposition over the case.83  Thus, the understanding of jura novit 
curia in Swedish law is that the court is obliged to research the law in order to apply the adequate legal 
provision and to assure a solution that is substantially  in accordance with the law.84 However, as to the 
legal significance that the parties give the invoked facts – the legal qualification of the facts85  – it 
seems that the parties’ right of disposition may prevail over jura novit curia. When the existence of a 
fact and its legal significance is expressly  admitted by  both parties, the tribunal may be bound by that 
legal qualification.86 There are also authors who argue that the parties under special circumstances may 
dispose of which legal rules the court applies.87
One important question in connection the application of jura novit curia regards the parties’ right to be 
heard. This issue, related to procedural fairness, is raised when the court considers the application of  a 
legal provision that has not been discussed during the proceedings and to which neither party  has 
referred. From the parties’ perspective, the opportunity  to comment on such a legal provision, and the 
opportunity to accordingly adapt their litigation strategies, may  be crucial. It is therefore advisable for 
the court to allow the parties to comment on any  legal provisions or issues that are raised ex officio.88 It 
is not entirely clear which procedural principle the court would violate by not allowing the parties such 
opportunity, but is is more likely a violation of the duty to properly  exercise case management, as 
opposed to a violation of the principle of contradiction.89  In any event, it seems that the court is not 
obliged to give the parties the opportunity to comment on legal provisions or issues raised ex officio, as 
failing to do so does not in itself constitute a procedural error.90
2.2.1 Foreign law in Swedish courts
When a Swedish court applies foreign law, the effect of the principle jura novit curia is slightly 
modified. A Swedish judge has a responsibility for making sure that the foreign law is ascertained and 
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83 Ekelöf (1956) p. 255.
84 Ekelöf & Boman (2002) p. 61, Ekelöf, Edelstam & Heuman (2009) p. 302. See also Kleineman (2009) p. 106-107.
85  The term legal qualification is not employed in English law. For the purpose of this thesis, the term is given the same 
meaning as qualification juridique in French law or rättslig klavificering in Swedish law, and refers to the legal 
significance a certain fact or series of facts is given, e.g. the qualification of a certain business relationship as a partnership. 
86 See NJA 1992 p. 375, NJA 2010 p. 643, Westberg (JT 2011/12) p. 179 et seq. and Rättegång IV (7 ed) p. 70. 
87 See Lindell (2003) p. 62 and Madsen (JT 2010/11) p. 488.  Supreme Court cases NJA 1978 p. 334 and NJA 1983 p. 3 are 
used as support for this view by Lindell.
88 See Ekelöf, Edelstam & Heuman (2009) p. 304 and Fitger, Rättegångsbalken, p. 42:29 et seq. See also NJA 1993 p. 13 in 
which the Supreme court decided to resume hearings in order to let the parties comment on a legal issue that decided the 
outcome of the dispute in front of the Scania and Blekinge Court of Appeal, but that was not discussed by the parties in the 
proceedings.
89 Lindell (1988) p. 38 et seq.
90 Ekelöf, Edelstam & Heuman (2009) p. 304, Heuman (JT 1992/93) p. 919 et seq. and Kleineman (2009) p. 99-101. See 
also NJA 1989 p. 614 and Supreme Court Justice Lind’s comment on p. 622.
remains free to make use of his own knowledge and to conduct his own legal research.91  It is also 
advisable that the the parties are given the opportunity to comment on the judge’s findings.92
The important difference between application of foreign law and lex fori is that when foreign law 
applies, the judge is not obliged to establish its content  himself. Under Chapter 35 Section 2 of the 
SCJP, the court may request that a party presents evidence on the content of foreign law. This 
possibility remains facultative, but should not be used when the court is in a better position to conduct 
the necessary research than the parties.93  The request should be addressed to the party who relies on 
the foreign legal provision.94  As to the issue of how the foreign law should be proved, the principle of 
free evidence applies. Translations, expert witnesses and extract from legal literature are examples of 
measures that might be used.95
How the court shall proceed if the content of the foreign law remains unascertained, despite efforts 
made by  the parties and the court, is not entirely clear.96 The most likely resolution would be that the 
court applies the lex fori, i.e. Swedish law. This has been the case in Swedish appeal court practice. It 
is however possible that the foreign law will still be taken into account, insofar that the court will not 
rule in favor of the claimant unless it is reasonable that the dispute is decided on the basis of Swedish 
law. This would allow the court to consider which party should bear the risk of the content of the 
foreign law remaining unascertained.97
2.3 England
In English law, being a common law system, civil procedure is generally  described as adversarial. 
Although English civil procedure has become less adversarial over time,98  the adversarial principle is 
still reflected in the way the content of the law is ascertained in English courts. English courts consider 
the parties’ lawyers to be responsible for the legal analysis, even though no such formal obligation 
exists.99  The parties are also free to explicitly exclude a certain legal provision from application by the 
court. Should the parties instead overlook the correct  interpretation of the law it  is not entirely clear 
how an English judge should proceed. Most authors and judges still argue that  jura novit curia is not – 
and never has been – part  of English law.100  Nevertheless, there are prominent judges, e.g. Lord 
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91  Bogdan (2008) p. 54 et seq and Jänterä-Jareborg (1997) p. 236. In this context,  the 1968 European Convention on 
information on foreign law should be mention. Through the convention – signed by the members of the Council of Europe 
– the contracting states has undertaken to, upon request, supply each others judicial authorities with information on their 
domestic law on civil and commercial matters. The convention provides a practical instrument, although only available to 
national courts, to ascertain foreign law. 
92 Gov’t Bill 1973:158 p. 108 and Bogdan (2008) p.54
93 Gov’t Bill 1973:158 p. 107-108 and Jänterä-Jareborg (1997) p. 236.
94 Jänterä-Jareborg (1997) pp. 238-240.
95 Bogdan (2008) p. 55.
96 Jänterä-Jareborg (1997) p. 332–359 and Bogdan (2008) p. 56-58.
97 Bogdan (2008) p. 57-58 and Jänterä-Jareborg (1997) p. 359.
98 Jolowicz (ICLQ 2003) p.281.
99 Andrews (2003) p. 121.
100 See e.g. Andrews (2003) p 93.
Denning, who argue that an English judge should apply the correct understanding of the law if he 
notices the parties’ misperception of it.101  Whatever the case might be, an English judge shall under no 
circumstances decide a case on a legal basis or authority  raised ex officio without giving the parties an 
opportunity to comment on his findings.102
2.3.1 Foreign law in English courts
Under English law, foreign law is a question of fact and not of law.103 Consequently, it must be pleaded 
and proved – and may also be admitted – by the parties.104  Furthermore, an English judge will not 
research the content of the foreign law, because under common law ”the trial is not an inquisition into 
the content of relevant foreign law any more than it is an inquisition into other factual issues”.105  In 
fact, an English judge is not permitted to conduct his own research as to the content of foreign law.106 
However, although considered as fact, foreign law is fact of a peculiar kind. In case of appeal, findings 
on foreign law are reevaluated more as points of law than as facts.107
The point of departure when applying foreign law in an English court is that its content is the same as 
the lex fori, i.e. English law.108  It is for the party who has pleaded the foreign law to prove the 
difference: Should he fail to plead the foreign law, or to sufficiently prove its content, the court will 
resolve the dispute on the basis of English law.109
To prove foreign law, a party cannot simply hand over a text or translation of the foreign legal 
provision, nor would reference to a foreign court ruling be acceptable proof of foreign law.110  The 
method of proving foreign law is by expert witness, normally  in the form of written statement. A 
competent expert witness is someone in a position where he necessarily gains knowledge and 
experience of the applicable law in question.111  Although the exact qualifications necessary  for an 
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101 Andrews (1994) and there cited Goldsmith v. Sperrings Ltd and others, (1977) 1 WLR, 478, p. 508.
102 Andrews (1994) pp. 48-49. 
103 There are important exceptions to this rule. Foreign law need probably not be proved when it is notorious, neither where 
statute confers judicial notice of particular laws or if it is possible to establish foreign law simply from studying foreign 
legal materials. (See Fentiman (1998) p. 3 et seq.) Similarly, where the parties agree, an English court may apply foreign 
law without proof, but the court is reluctant to accept such requests and is free decline them. (See Dicey, Morris & Collins 
(2006) p 258.) Lastly, it should be mentioned that under Section 4(2) of the Civil Evidence Act 1972, previous rulings in 
which the content of a given foreign law has been established may be invoked to create a presumption of the content of that 
foreign law, subject to certain conditions. (See Cheshire, North & Fawcett (2008) p. 113-117).
104  Grupo Torras v. Sheikh Fahad [1995] EWHC 1 (Comm). See also e.g. Cheshire, North & Fawcett (2008) p. 111 and 
Dicey, Morris & Collins (2006) p 255-258.
105 Neilson v Overseas Projects Corp of Victoria Ltd [2005] HCA 54, (2005) 221 A.L.R. 213, at [118].
106  See Bumper Developmet Corporation v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1991] 1 WLR 1362 (CA) where a 
judgement was reversed because the judges conducted their own legal research.
107 See Parkasho v Singh [1968] P 233 at [250] cited in Cheshire, North and Fawcett (2008) p. 113.
108 See e.g. PT Pan Indonesia Bank Ltd TBK v Marconi Communications International Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 422 at [70].
109 See Global Multimedia International Ltd v ARA Media Services &  Anor [2006] EWHC 3612 (Ch) at [38]. See also, e.g. 
Cheshire, North and Fawcett (2008) pp. 111-112 and Dicey, Morris and Collins (2006) p. 255 et seq.
110 Cheshire, North and Fawcett (2008) p. 113-117.
111 Civil Evidence Act 1972 Section 4(1).
expert witness have nor been entirely clarified, practical, and in some cases academic, knowledge and 
experience is usually sufficient.112 
If the parties disagree on the content of the applicable law, they will normally call one expert witness 
each, who in turn normally will disagree.113  The court will then decides which witness it prefers. The 
court may also accept parts of the evidence of each party. Should an expert witness remain 
uncontradicted the court should however be reluctant to reject the witness, unless its statement on the 
content of the foreign law seems absurd. 114 The court is free to review the sources of law presented by 
an expert in its evaluation of the expert’s statement – and is even bound to do so when experts disagree 
– but the court is not entitled to go beyond the explicit subjects of reference.115
2.4 France
In French civil procedure, jura novit curia applies. It is often said that the facts are for the parties and 
the law is for the judge.116 The discretion of the judge in applying the law is however counterbalanced 
by the principe de disposition and the principe de la contradiction finding statutory  expression in Art 
12(3) and 16 of the French Code of civil procedure117  (CPC). The former allows the parties, by  explicit 
agreement, to limit the judge’s discretion to apply only certain legal provisions, and the latter obliges 
the judge to let the parties comment on any legal basis raised ex officio.118
Regarding the exact legal basis upon which the court bases its judgement, the traditional view is that 
the judge may freely apply  the legal provision he sees fit  to the facts presented by the parties. The 
parties decide the litigious facts and the judge may conduct his own legal research in order to decide 
the applicable rule and the way it is be applied. This is expressed through the maxim da mihi factum, 
dabo tibi jus: give me the facts, I will give you the law.119  However, there are notable exceptions to 
this provision. 
Under Art. 12 of the CPC the court has an obligation to give the correct legal qualifications of the 
invoked facts regardless of the denomination argued for by the parties. The court is however not 
obliged to examine the legal basis – le moyen de droit – invoked by the parties or to raise any other 
legal basis ex officio.120 
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attorney was the expert witness for one party and a professor at New York University who was ”one of the leading 
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113 Hartley (ICLQ 1996) p. 284.
114 Grupo Torras v. Sheikh Fahad [1995] EWHC 1 (Comm).
115 See e.g. Arros Invest Ltd v Rafik Nishanov [2004] EWHC 576 (Ch) at [22] and Dicey, Morris and Collins (2006) p. 263.
116 Jolowicz (ICLQ 2003) p. 292.
117 Code de procédure civile.
118 Jolowicz (ICLQ 2003) p. 292 and Wijffels (van Rhee 2005) p. 269 et seq.
119 Guinchard, Chainais & Ferrand (2010) p. 341 and 398 et seq.
120 Guinchard, Chainais & Ferrand (2010) pp. 413-414.
A fairly  recent case from the Cour de cassation – the highest civil court in France – examined the 
judge’s obligation to apply rules ex officio.121  It is said that the obligation under Art. 12 CPC to give 
the correct legal qualification to facts only applies within the limits of the parties’ claims and only  to 
the facts explicitly invoked by the parties, as opposed to facts discussed in general terms during the 
proceedings. Furthermore, if a party has made reference to a specific legal basis for a claim, the judge 
is not obliged to modify that party’s claim, nor the legal basis for the claim.122
The principle of contradiction takes a central role in French civil procedure and partially  limits the 
judge’s power to apply legal provisions or issues raised ex offico. Art. 16(1) of the CPC states that the 
principle of contradiction must be upheld by the judge.123 Under Art. 16(3), the judge may  not base his 
decision on a legal basis – moyen de droit – to which neither party has referred to, unless the judge first 
invites the parties to comment on such legal basis.124
2.4.1 Foreign law in French courts
During the second half of the 20th century, the issue of foreign law in French courts became subject to 
dramatic developments and extensive case law from the Cour de Cassation.125 
The point of departure under French law has traditionally been that foreign law is treated as fact. 
Consequently, the Cour de cassation systematically refuses to control the appeal courts’ interpretations 
of foreign law, the parties need to prove its content and, until recently, the court was not  obliged to 
apply  the foreign law ex officio.126  Today, when the case concerns rights of which the parties do not 
dispose freely, the judge must apply the foreign law ex offcio and the parties need not invoke it. 
Regarding the rights of which the parties do dispose freely, the judge has the power to apply foreign 
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122  See Cass. Ass. plén.,  21 déc. 2007, BICC, 15 avr. 2008, rapport Loriferne et avis R. de Gouttes: ”Mais attendu que si, 
parmi les principes directeurs du procès,  l’article 12 du nouveau code de procédure civile oblige le juge à donner ou 
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See also Guinchard, Chainais & Ferrand (2010) p. 426 et seq.
123 Le juge doit, en toutes circonstances, faire observer et observer lui-même le principe de la contradiction.
124  Il ne peut fonder sa décision sur les moyens de droit qu'il a relevés d'office sans avoir au préalable invité les parties à 
présenter leurs observations.
125 For long, by virtue of the Bisbal case (Cass. 1er Ch. Civ., 12 may 1959, Ancel & Lequette (2006), No. 32-34, 1st case) a 
french judge was not obliged to apply foreign law ex officio. Nevertheless, he had the power to do so (Case Compagnie 
algerienne de Credit et de Banque v. Chemouny, Cass.  1er Ch. Civ., 2 mars 1960, Ancel & Lequette (2006) No.32-34, 2nd 
case).  In the two cases Rebouh and Schule (Cass.  Civ. 1re, 11 octobre 1988, Rebouh et 18 octobre 1988, Schule, Ancel & 
Lequette (2006), No.  74-78, 1st-2nd case) from 1988, the Cour de Cassation dramatically reversed its previous position and 
ruled that foreign law must be applied ex officio. Two years later, this case law was in turn modified by the Coveco ruling 
(Cass. Civ. 1re, 4 décembre 1990,  Coveco, Ancel & Lequette (2006),  No. 74-78, 3rd case) where the Cour de Cassation 
ruled that the judge need only apply foreign law ex offcio when that foreign law is applicable by virtue of an international 
convention and where the dispute concerns a matter of which the parties do not have free disposition of their rights.  Some 
years later, another major modification to this case law was presented when the Cour de cassation suspended the obligation 
to apply foreign law ex officio by virtue of international conventions in the ruling Mutuelles du Mans (Cass. Civ. 1re, 26 
mai 1999, RCDIP 1999, p. 707, note Muir-Watt.).
126 Loussouarn, Bourel & de Vareilles-Sommières (2007) p. 308.
law ex officio, but not the obligation; in such a situation lex fori may be applied if neither party invokes 
the foreign law.127
As to ascertaining the contents of foreign law, this is also an area that has been subject to numerous 
modifications and controversial case law.128 There is no longer a distinction between matters where the 
parties dispose of their rights and matters where they do not. Furthermore, there is no distinction 
between the cases where a party has invoked the foreign law and where the judge has declared it 
applicable ex officio. Previously  a responsibility  of the parties, it is now the obligation of the judge to 
ascertain the content of the foreign law ex officio and to apply it correctly:129 
”iI incombe au juge français qui reconnaît applicable un droit étranger d'en rechercher, soit d'office, soit à la 
demande d'une partie qui l'invoque, la teneur, avec le concours des parties et personnellement s'il y a lieu, et 
de donner à la question litigieuse une solution conforme au droit positif étranger”130
A French judge may however demand the parties to assist him,131 normally by producing a certificat de 
coutume.132 Should the parties fail to establish the content of the foreign law, the judge is duty bound 
to establish its content himself. Only where special circumstances have prevented, or made virtually 
impossible the ascertainment of the content of the foreign law, may the French judge apply lex fori by 
default.133  Thus, previously  treated mainly as a matter of fact, foreign law is increasingly being treated 
as a matter of law in French courts.134
2.5 Switzerland 
Swiss civil procedure – aside from the procedure before the Tribunal fédéral – has traditionally fallen 
within the exclusive competence of the cantons. In general, civil procedure in Switzerland has 
however been influenced by German and French civil procedure.135  The most important role of the 
judge is – in accordance with the principle jura novit curia – to apply the law in a substantially correct 
manner to the facts presented by the parties.136  The parties’ right to be heard – the scope of which 
primarily  falls within the competence of the courts of the different cantons – was however guaranteed 
by the Swiss federal constitution.137  This right obliges the local courts – at the pain of having their 
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130 Cas. Civ. 1re, 28 juin 2005, Bull. I. n° 289 p. 240.
131 Ancel & Lequette (2006) No. 82-83, p. 723.
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certificats de coutume is the most common way for the parties to establish the content of foreign law in French courts. See 
Ferrand (2011) p. 240.
133  See e.g.  Cass. Civ. 1re, 16 Nov 2004, Bull.  I. n° 259 p 225. See also Loussouarn, Bourel & de Vareilles-Sommières 
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137  Constitution fédérale de la Confédération suisse du 18 avril 1999 Art. 29(2), before that Constitution fédérale de la 
Confédération suisse du 29 mai 1874 Art. 4.
judgements annulled – to provide the parties with an opportunity  to comment if the court considers to 
apply  a legal provision or argument that has not been discussed by the parties, the application of which 
the parties could not reasonably have predicted.138
As of 2011, Switzerland’s first federal code of civil procedure entered into force, the Swiss Code of 
Civil Procedure139  (SCPC). Under Art. 57 and 58 of the SCPC, it is now explicitly stated the court 
applies the law ex officio, within the limits of the parties claims. Art. 53 of the SCPC ensures the 
parties right to be heard.
2.5.1 Foreign law in Swiss courts
Until 1989, ascertaining the content of foreign law in Swiss courts was governed by  canton law and it 
was generally treated as a matter of fact to be proved by the party relying on the foreign law. In the 
absence of sufficient proof, Swiss law was generally applied.140  This practice was modified in 1989 
when the Swiss Act of Private International Law141  (LDIP) entered into force. As a general principle, 
jura novit curia now also applies to foreign law in Swiss courts.142
Under the LDIP, foreign law is applied ex officio,143 and under paragraph 1 Art. 16 of the LDIP, its 
content is established ex officio by the court. This may be the main rule, but the judge is still 
empowered to request the assistance of the parties in establishing the content of foreign law. In matters 
concerning pecuniary claims,144  the parties may even be imposed the ”burden of proof” regarding the 
content of the foreign law.145 
Although the wording of Art. 16 reads ”la preuve peut être mise à la charge des parties”, it is not 
completely accurate to speak of a burden of proof; the failure to ”prove” the content of the foreign law 
does not result in a ruling against the party relying on it.146  Instead, paragraph 2 Art. 16 of LDIP 
provides that Swiss law is applied if the party who relies on a foreign legal rule fails to sufficiently 
establish its content.147  The practical function of Art. 16 therefore appears to be to allow the court to 
redistribute some of its workload to the parties.148  As to matter others than pecuniary claims, the court 
24
138 See e.g. ATF 114 Ia 97 and ATF 107 V 246.
139 Code de procédure civile du 19 décembre 2008.
140 Hartley (ICLQ 1996) p. 277 and Dutoit (2001) p. 51.
141 Loi fédérale sur le droit international privé du 18 décembre 1987.
142 Dutoit (2001) pp. 51-53.
143 Dutoit (2001) p. 51.
144  In Swiss law, the term pecuniary claim – or matière patrimoniale in French – is given a broad interpretation and is 
understood best as any issue in which the parties have a financial interest. Dutoit (2001) p. 54-55.
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147 ”Le droit suisse s’applique si le contenu du droit étranger ne peut pas être établi.”
148 Hartley (ICLQ 1996) p. 277.
may only apply Swiss law if, after reasonable efforts, the court does not succeed in ascertaining the 
content of the foreign law.149
Should the court have established the content of the foreign law ex officio, it must allow the parties to 
comment on statements made by experts, institutes and other third parties as well as on the content of 
legal sources. Should the court  consider application of the law in a surprising manner, the parties must 
also be provided with an opportunity  to comment. The parties have the right to comment on any legal 
arguments of which they are unaware, if such application would be considered unpredictable. Denying 
the parties an opportunity to comment on the court’s legal research or the a surprising application of 
the foreign law would constitute grounds for annulling the court’s judgement.150
2.6 Summarizing conclusions of comparative outlook
In all three civil law jurisdictions, jura novit curia applies, and embodies a conception of how powers 
and duties should be allocated between the parties and the court. The general understanding of the 
principle seems to be a duty  for the court to ascertain the content of the law on its own motion and an 
obligation to apply legal provisions ex officio to the facts invoked by the parties. This power is limited 
in different  ways by the parties’ right of disposition and the right to be heard. There is however no 
common conception as to what extent the national courts’ powers are limited by the rights of the 
parties, and thus no uniform application of jura novit curia.
The fact that there is no uniform understanding of jura novit curia is even more accentuated when 
comparing how foreign law is treated in the jurisdictions where the principle applies. In this situation, 
the court’s obligation to establish the content of the law is limited in all three civil law jurisdictions. 
Obliging the court to ascertain the content of foreign law would simply be too heavy a burden for the 
national court and an inefficient solution. Thus, in all four jurisdictions it is primarily  the parties that 
are responsible for ascertaining the content of foreign law. In Swiss law – similarly  to English law 
where foreign law is treated as fact – the parties even bear the risk of the foreign law not being 
ascertained. 
Although a clear difference exist between England and the civil law jurisdictions as to how the law is 
ascertained and applied, there are also similarities that unite the jurisdictions beyond the civil-common 
law dichotomy. There are also considerable differences between the civil law systems. In all 
jurisdictions except for Sweden, the court has a duty  – at least to some extent  – to afford the parties an 
opportunity to comment on points of law that  are raised ex officio. In this way, the powers of the 
tribunal is limited by the parties’ right to be heard. As to the parties’ right of disposition of the 
applicable law, France and England allow the parties to exclude certain legal provisions from being 
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applied, whereas in Sweden, the application of the law falls almost entirely within the domain of the 
court’s competence. One might say that in relation to the applicable law, the Swedish legal system is 
the most inquisitorial. 
As evidenced, neither the adversarial-inquisitorial nor the fact-law dichotomy is decisive for indicating 
how the applicable law is ascertained and applied. Furthermore, the question of whether jura novit 
curia applies or not is not one single question of fundamental importance for ascertaining and applying 
the law. Rather, the question of how to ascertain and apply the law consists of a series of regulatory 
options where considerations of practicality, principle and policy are made.
3. ASCERTAINING AND APPLYING THE LAW IN INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
Having examined the different methods of how law is ascertained and applied in national courts, we 
now turn to the field of international arbitration. 
3.1 The arbitral tribunal’s application of the law
I begin with a short note on what exactly is meant by  the applicable law that might be in place. Several 
different laws or legal systems may be applied in one single arbitration dispute:
• the law governing the parties’ authority to enter into an arbitration agreement;
• the law governing the arbitration agreement 151;
• the lex arbitri;
• the substantive law or laws applicable to the dispute;
• the law or laws governing the recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award.152
Depending on which aspect of the dispute or the procedure is concerned, different laws apply. As 
stated above, this thesis primarily focuses on the ascertainment and application of the applicable 
substantive law, i.e. the law applied by the arbitrators on the facts of the case to resolve the matter in 
dispute. 
3.1.1 The importance of the principle of party autonomy 
International arbitration rests on the foundation of party  autonomy. It is from the contract and the 
parties’ common intentions that the arbitrators derive their powers. The principle of party autonomy 
gives the parties the freedom to decide the rules governing the arbitral procedure, the applicable 
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substantive law, the seat of the arbitration and so on.153 International commercial arbitration in Sweden 
is also based on the principle of party autonomy, which provides the parties the liberty  to choose the 
applicable law, the structure and form of the proceedings and the limits within which the arbitral 
tribunal may rule.154 
Should the parties not exercise the aforementioned liberty, the form of the proceedings are left to the 
discretion of the arbitrators, limited only by fundamental procedural principles.155  The arbitrators are 
always obliged to ensure principles of due process: to treat the parties equally, to give each party the 
opportunity to be heard and present his case and to study relevant material, and to ensure the 
transparency and the reasonable predictability of the arbitration.156 
Under the principle of party autonomy, the parties are free to agree that the arbitral tribunal shall try 
the case with application of a certain legal provision only. The parties may also exclude certain legal 
provisions from application or they  may explicitly decide that the arbitral tribunal may only consider 
the legal arguments and materials that have been presented by  the parties.157  Thus, party autonomy 
extends also to the arbitral tribunal’s application of the law and the balance between the roles of 
tribunal and parties.158  It should however be noted that in practice, agreements regarding the 
arbitrators’ application of the law are rare, and the issue is generally not broached in discussion by the 
arbitrators.159 
As to the choice of the arbitral seat, it may have profound legal consequences on the arbitration and 
may even materially alter its course.160
3.1.2 The importance of the arbitral seat and the lex arbitri 
Contrary  to national courts, an arbitral tribunal has no lex fori.161 Consequently, arbitration in Sweden 
does not follow the procedural rules of the SCJP.162  The rationale is that the parties’ choice of Sweden 
as an arbitral seat probably has nothing or little to do with Swedish procedural law. Although many 
provisions from the SCJP might be suitable for application in domestic arbitration, they might be 
specifically unsuitable in international arbitration.163
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Two sets of rules primarily apply to the arbitral procedure: the lex arbitri, and the applicable 
procedural law or rules. Unfortunately, confusion between the two is not uncommon.164
The lex arbitri is generally decided by the locus arbitri, the seat of the arbitration.165  The seat of the 
arbitration is, in turn, agreed upon by the parties.166 Thus, the parties may only  indirectly chose the lex 
arbitri. The procedural law or rules however – as explained above in 3.1.1 – fall directly within the 
scope of the party autonomy and might thus be decided by the parties.167  The lex arbitri contains 
provisions that govern arbitration in a given country.168  Even though it generally contains some 
mandatory or guiding rules on the arbitral procedure, these are often limited to fundamental procedural 
safeguards and principles.169 As to the procedural rules applied, the parties will rarely have designated 
any.170
Under Section 47 of the SAA, the SAA is the lex arbitri to arbitration with its seat in Sweden.
3.1.3 Rules of ordre public
Since the arbitral tribunal has a general duty to render a valid and enforceable award, certain rules – 
from other sets of laws than the one chosen by the parties – might have to be applied ex officio to the 
dispute. These are mandatory rules – lois de police or lois d’application immédiate – that exist in every 
jurisdiction. In order to prevail over the parties’ choice of law, these mandatory  rules must be rules of 
international ordre public171 or international public policy. Because of the duty  of the arbitral tribunal 
to render an award that is enforceable and valid, these rules must be taken into consideration to some 
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169 Poudret & Besson (2007) p. 84.
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171 Although international commercial arbitration mainly concerns private law and legal issues of which the parties dispose 
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ordre public international. One example of such rules are rules of EU competition law, see Eco Swiss v Benetton, case 
C-126/97, ECR 1999-I See e.g. Kreindler (JWI 2003). p. 239 et seq. See also Bogdan (2008) p. 76 et seq. and 85 et seq. 
extent.172  The ascertainment and application of rules of ordre public raises other considerations than 
the ones analyzed in this thesis and the issue will therefore only be mentioned briefly.
First, it may be necessary  to consider mandatory rules of the arbitral seat in order to assure 
enforceability  of the award. Some authors nevertheless propose that these rules may be disregarder. 
Second, mandatory rules of jurisdictions where the award might have to be enforced may be taken into 
account by  the arbitrator in order to ensure the enforceability  of the award.173  Because of the difficulty 
in predicting where the arbitral award will be enforced, some authors recommend that  the arbitrators 
directly enforce rules of transnational ordre public common to most modern jurisdictions.174 
3.2 National arbitration laws
3.2.1 Sweden
The SAA does not explicitly  require the parties to refer to, or invoke, legal provisions or arguments.175 
The SAA only stipulates, under Section 23, that the parties shall state their claims and the cause of 
action.176  Consequently, the parties’ claims and facts provided in support thereof will set the limits of 
what the arbitral tribunal may rule on.177  As to ascertaining and applying the applicable law, the 
situation is however more uncertain.178
The principle of jura novit curia is discussed in the preparatory works of the SAA in connection with 
grounds for setting aside the award under Section 34(2) – excess of mandate. In this context, it is said 
that it ”seems obvious” that an arbitrator may  conduct his own legal research when e.g. interpreting a 
legal provision. When it comes to applying legal provisions ex officio, the statements are considerably 
more ambiguous. It is said that the jura novit curia applies in dubio in domestic arbitration – meaning 
that basing the award on a legal provision different from those invoked by the parties is not ground for 
setting aside an award. However, it is also said that in international arbitration, the parties may come 
from a legal tradition where jura novit curia does not apply. This must be reflected when defining the 
mission of the arbitrators and may result in a limitation of the arbitral tribunal’s power to apply of the 
law ex officio. In such cases, the preparatory works seem to imply  that deciding a dispute on a legal 
provision raised ex officio could be reason to set aside the award for excess of mandate. Without 
further guidance, the preparatory  works recognize the difficulty in formulating a precise rule as to the 
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tribunal’s competence on this matter, but emphasize that the arbitrators should always handle the cases 
in such a way  as to minimize surprises in the application of the law.179 Whether surprising the parties 
in such a way would constitute a procedural irregularity  is however not  discussed. On one issue 
however, the preparatory works provide more clear guidance: incorrect application of the law or failure 
to apply an applicable legal provision is not grounds for challenging an arbitral award.180 
On the subject of case management, the preparatory  works explain that if the arbitrators consider 
relevant a legal provision that  has not been mentioned by  the parties, the arbitrators should point this 
out to the parties as such. This straightforward guideline is however blurred by the following 
discussion on how special circumstances – the internationality  of a dispute for example – must be 
taken into consideration, and that, in some cases such as where the arbitrators are limited to the legal 
provisions invoked by  the parties, information on possibly  relevant alternative legal provisions should 
not be pointed out to the parties.181
Turning to the legal doctrine, one finds significantly clearer views, albeit not at all uniform, on how the 
arbitral tribunal should ascertain the content of the applicable law. To better examine the debate, I will 
consider the different viewpoints in three main groups.182 
3.2.1.1 Jura novit curia applies
Some authors – Lindskog and Kurkela – argue that the arbitrators are not only free, but even duty 
bound, to research the law and apply relevant legal provisions to which neither party has referred.183 
According to this view, the principal mission of the arbitral tribunal is to find a substantially correct 
solution to the dispute on the basis of the applicable law. Due to the specific character of international 
arbitration, some modification to this principle is however necessary. First, it should be the parties who 
bear the primary responsibility for establishing the content of the applicable law. But should the 
parties’ efforts not sufficiently establish the content of the applicable law, the arbitral tribunal is itself 
obliged to proceed with its own research.184  Lindskog does not rule out  that under special 
circumstances, failing to apply the correct legal provision might even be reason to set aside the 
award.185 
Second, if the arbitrators in their research deem that a legal basis or issue not discussed by the parties – 
but within the limits of their claims and presented facts – is relevant to the solution of the dispute, the 
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arbitrators should communicate this to the parties in order to avoid surprises.186 Should the arbitrators 
fail to point out a particular legal provision to the parties and then apply it to the dispute, there could 
be grounds for setting aside the award for a procedural irregularity  under Section 34(6) of the SAA.187 
Similarly, overly  active case management may  cause an arbitrator to appear partial – e.g. by  presenting 
a legal argument that may obviously help one party win the case, or by  revealing where an arbitrator 
stands on an issue in dispute – and constitute grounds for setting aside the award pursuant  to Section 
8(3) of the SAA.188
3.2.1.2 Restricted application of jura novit curia
Heuman, Kleineman and Hobér seem to be of the opinion that jura novit curia cannot be applied in 
international commercial arbitration, but that the arbitral tribunal has a discretionary power to raise 
new legal issues.189 
According to this approach, the parties themselves are responsible for ascertaining the applicable 
law.190  However, declares Kleineman, the arbitrators cannot refrain from resolving the dispute just 
because both parties’ legal arguments are incorrect, and neither should the arbitrators have the 
obligation to resolve the dispute on the basis of rules they  know to be inapplicable to the situation. 
Thus, it must be considered as a power, but not a duty, for the arbitral tribunal to ascertain the 
applicable law and raise legal issues ex officio.191
Heuman argues that generally, since the arbitrators are often unfamiliar with the applicable law, 
applying jura novit curia in international arbitration would not be suitable. Due to the risk of mistakes 
in the application of the law, it is more important to strictly apply the principle of contradiction and 
ensure that the parties have the opportunity to comment on anything that the arbitrators have read in 
statutes, precedents, or legal literature, which was not invoked by the parties themselves.192  Thus, it 
seems that Heuman assumes that the arbitral tribunal may conduct its own legal research. Arguments 
of a more simplistic nature may however be inserted into the award without giving the parties the 
opportunity to comment.193  Heuman however provides us with the reservation that it in international 
arbitration, it  is not inconceivable that the arbitral tribunal may be bound by the legal arguments of the 
parties, depending on the parties’ legal backgrounds.194  It is also important that the parties are given 
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sufficient time to research and analyze the new legal material introduced, not giving the parties this 
opportunity might also be ground to set aside an award.195
Hobér argues that even though it naturally  is every arbitrator’s ambition to find a substantially correct 
legal outcome to the dispute, doing so is no obligation for the arbitral tribunal. Rather, the tribunal has 
an obligation to decide the dispute on the basis of facts, arguments and evidence presented by the 
parties.196  An application of legal rules or arguments that the parties have not referred to would 
probably  be grounds for setting aside the award for excess of mandate under the SAA 34(2) as well as 
for being a procedural irregularity  under 34(6). However, if the arbitrators become aware of a legal 
rule they think might be relevant, but which the parties have not discussed, they should ”resolve these 
issues with the parties” in order to avoid surprises.197  It is not entirely  clear if Hobér considers it 
necessary  that  a party expressively  relies on a legal basis or argument in order for the tribunal to apply 
it or if it is sufficient that the parties have been afforded an opportunity to comment on the legal basis 
or argument, in order for the tribunal to apply it. The bottom line seems to be that the parties must  be 
properly informed about the legal basis that might be applied by the tribunal.198
On the issue of the parties’ right to comment on legal issues, Kleineman takes a radically different 
approach than Heuman and Hobér. He argues that the possibilities to communicate legal provisions 
raised ex officio to the parties should be limited. Only if raised in an early stage of the proceedings, and 
where it  can be done without the tribunal appearing biased or partial, should this be permitted. If the 
arbitrators do not  raise a given legal provision before deliberations, they should in all cases refrain 
from communicating the provision to the parties, but they  may still decide the dispute on its basis.199 
According to Kleineman, as the main obligation of the arbitrator is to resolve the dispute in a 
substantially  correct way under the applicable law, an award cannot be set aside because of a 
surprising application of the law.200
3.2.1.3 Jura novit curia does not apply
Calissendorff and Madsen seem to take a third stance in the debate, arguing that jura novit curia 
should be not applied in international arbitration in Sweden.201 Even though jura novit curia – due to 
its status as a general procedural principle in Swedish law – might in principle apply to international 
arbitration, Calissendorff and Madsen consider the principe of party autonomy to be of far greater 
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importance. They also point out that the parties in international commercial arbitration generally 
should be considered as equal, which diminishes the need to protect them from ignorance of the law.202
Madsen argues that because the application of the law in international arbitration is subject to the 
principle of party  autonomy, the legal basis presented by the parties should normally be regarded as 
setting an outer parameter – similar to the parties’ claims and presented facts – upon which the arbitral 
tribunal may rule. Conducting further legal research to check for other rules not invoked by  the parties 
must therefore normally be regarded as falling outside the scope of the arbitrators’ mission. 
Furthermore, the arbitrators, who must remain impartial, should refrain from pointing out applicable 
legal provisions to which the parties have not referred. Pointing out  such provisions however, would 
not be grounds for setting aside an award.203 Madsen partially bases his view on the need for a uniform 
international practice in procedural law of international arbitration, a practice that individuals from 
different legal cultures will perceive as predictable.204
As to reasons for setting aside an award, Madsen is of the opinion that  even though the arbitral tribunal 
might not in principle be bound by  the legal basis put forward by  the parties,205  if the parties’ conduct 
and legal arguments in the proceedings clearly  indicate the legal basis they consider applicable to the 
disputes, such conduct could be deemed an implicit agreement. Basing the award on another legal 
basis could therefore akin to ruling ultra petita and would constitute grounds for setting aside the 
award under SAA section 34(2).206  Basing the award on legal principles not invoked by the parties 
without giving them the opportunity to comment could also be cause for setting aside the award.207  By 
contrast, ignoring to apply a legal provision not invoked – even if it may be applicable – is never 
grounds for setting aside an award.208
Calissendorff’s argument for not applying jura novit curia in arbitration looks slightly different. As 
surprises in the application of the law must be avoided, two alternatives arise: sticking to the parties 
legal arguments or communicating the legal issues raised ex officio. Since it is likely  that a legal 
provision raised ex officio would benefit only one of the parties, or at least benefit one party more than 
the other, introducing a new legal provision would surely be considered partial, especially by foreign 
parties who are not accustomed to the Swedish legal system. Furthermore, such new legal provisions 
are often not raised until the deliberations. It would be contrary to the duty  of the arbitrators to manage 
the procedure in an efficient and speedy  manner – expressed in section 21 of the SAA – if the 
arbitrators reopened the case to invite the parties to comment after it  has been closed for deliberations. 
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For these reasons, the arbitral tribunal should refrain from conducting its own legal research and from 
applying legal provisions ex officio.209 
Calissendorff however recommends that the arbitrators inquire as to whether the parties wish to apply 
jura novit curia or not. Should the parties disagree on the matter, the arbitrator may still proceed and 
refrain from apply  jura novit curia, sticking rather to application of legal provisions invoked by the 
parties.210
Other authors also argue that jura novit curia does not apply in international arbitration in Sweden, but 
with different results. According to this view, the arbitrators may not conduct any legal research. It is 
instead left entirely  to the parties’ responsibility to prove the content of the applicable law. 
Nevertheless, within the limits of the sources and legal materials presented by the parties, the arbitral 
tribunal is free to apply the law without regard to what legal rules the parties have, or have not, 
invoked.211
3.2.1.4 Case law
Swedish case law on the arbitral tribunal’s powers to ascertain and apply  the law is scarce, and such 
rulings will often only  deal with the outer limits of the arbitral tribunal’s power. However, there are 
rulings from challenge proceedings in the Svea court of appeal where jura novit curia is discussed.
In a the Svea court of appeal judgement from 27 august 2004 in case T 7866-02, the claimant alleged 
that the arbitral tribunal had ruled on circumstances that had not been invoked and thus exceeded its 
mandate. Even though both parties were Swedish, one was a resident of another country, thus giving 
the dispute an international connection.212
In connection with discussing fundamental procedural principles equally applicable to arbitration, the 
Svea court of appeal declared that a court may not rule on circumstances that have not been invoked. 
However, the court continued, it is not necessary  that the parties invoke any legal basis. Instead, the 
principle of jura novit curia applies, i.e. the court applies the legal basis it considers relevant and 
draws its own legal conclusions regardless of what the parties have claimed, invoked or argued for.213 
Although not  expressively stated, it is implied by the court that jura novit curia applies in the same 
way to arbitral proceedings. Still, jura novit curia was not applied in the challenge proceedings, which 
instead focused on interpretation and application of different contractual provisions.
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Jura novit curia also came up  in a challenge action case concerning investment  arbitration between the 
Republic of Moldavia and a Russian investor. 214  In the arbitral award that was being challenged,215 the 
arbitrator had awarded the Russian citizen consequential damages even though he had only argued for 
direct damages to a company owned by him. The arbitral tribunal asserted that it  had acted 
appropriately, within the realm of the Russian investor’s claims, and had referred only to legal sources 
already invoked. The Republic of Moldavia however challenged the award on several grounds, 
including that the arbitral tribunal had founded the award on a legal basis that was surprising to the 
parties, which made it impossible for Moldavia to defend itself with legal arguments.
The Svea court of appeal ruled that the Russian citizen had made a claim for damages, had provided 
factual circumstances to this end, and that the arbitrator had kept within the amount claimed and only 
ruled on the presented factual circumstances. The ”surprise” legal basis upon which the arbitrator 
awarded the party damages was only considered another ”legal qualification” of the invoked facts. 
Although consequential damages had never been argued for, the court considered that sources in 
support for consequential damages had been referred to by the parties. The court ruled that the 
principle of jura novit curia had not in fact  been incorrectly applied and rejected the challenge 
action.216  Interestingly, the fact that  the case concerned international arbitration was not taken into 
consideration by the court, nor was the allegation of the surprising application of the law. 
3.2.2 England
The English Arbitration Act 1996 (EAA) Art. 34(1) and (2)(g) read:
It shall be for the tribunal to decide all procedural and evidential matters, subject to the right of the parties 
to agree any matter. 
Procedural and evidential matters include [...] whether and to what extend the tribunal should itself take the 
initiative in ascertaining the facts and the law.
Without  offering further guidance on how the arbitrators should ascertain the content of the applicable 
law, the issue is left to the arbitral tribunal’s discretion, subject of course to the parties’ agreement. The 
tribunal is explicitly empowered to ascertain the content of the applicable law ex officio. From a 
common law point of view, this implies that the arbitrators have the power to act inquisitorially  in 
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relation to the applicable law.217  There is however no obligation for the arbitral tribunal to apply  or 
ascertain the applicable law ex officio. In the case Hussman (Europe) Ltd. v. Al Ameen Dev. & Trade 
Co,218  the commercial court held that, although section 46(1)(a) of the EAA states that the arbitral 
tribunal shall apply the law chosen by the parties, if the parties do not suggest that there is a specific 
issue under the applicable law that is different from English law, the tribunal is free to decide the case 
according to English law and the basis on the presumption that the two laws’ content is the same. Thus, 
absent agreement to the contrary, the arbitral tribunal is free to let the parties prove the law also in 
international arbitration.219 In its ruling, the court endorsed the view of one of the leading authorities in 
English arbitration law, Lord Mustill.220  The ruling has however been subject to critique by  Lew, who 
argues that applying English law, and not the law chosen by  the parties, could be grounds to refuse 
enforcement of the award under the New York Convention Art. V(1)(b) and V(1)(c) for excess of 
power. Lew argues that  even though the parties should be primarily responsible for ascertaining the 
applicable law, the tribunal is free to conduct its own research and should do so where the parties 
submissions are insufficient to resolve the dispute.221 
Should the arbitral tribunal make its own research into the applicable law, it must however 
communicate its findings to the parties in order to let them comment before basing the award, or part 
of an award, on these findings.222 Under section 33(1)(a) of the EAA, the arbitral tribunal has a general 
obligation to act fairly and impartially  and give each party  the opportunity to present its case and to 
deal with that of his opponent. Not giving a party the opportunity  to address a legal issue, argument or 
source that is raised ex officio is seen a breach of section 33, and as a breach of natural justice under 
English law.223 This is also the case where the parties have agreed that the arbitrator may  himself act as 
an expert on the applicable law.224  A breach of natural justice (or ”due process” as it  is called in the 
United States) is grounds for challenging the award, amounting to a serious irregularity under section 
68(2)(a) of the EAA.225  The award will however only be set aside where a substantial injustice has 
been caused by the irregularity.
The notion of substantial injustice is intended to be applied to support, and not to interfere with, the 
arbitral process.226  Thus, if an arbitrator cites legal sources in the award which neither party has 
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invoked or had the opportunity  to comment on, the award is still only set aside if a party can show it 
led to a substantial injustice.227 
"The element of substantial injustice in the context of s.68 does not in such a case depend on the arbitrator 
having come to the wrong conclusion as a matter of law or fact but whether he was caused by adopting 
inappropriate means to reach one conclusion whereas had he adopted appropriate means he might well have 
reached another conclusion favourable to the applicant. Thus,  where there has been an irregularity of 
procedure, it is enough if it is shown that it caused the arbitrator to reach a conclusion unfavourable to the 
applicant which, but for the irregularity,  he might well never have reached, provided always that the opposite 
conclusion is at least reasonably arguable.”228
The application of the element of substantial injustice ensures that awards are only set aside in cases 
where there is a realistic chance of reversing or changing the award,229  or where the irregularity  has 
had a real or substantial effect on the applicant.230
3.2.3 France
International arbitration law in France is governed by a special chapter in the CPC. Together with the 
remainder of French arbitration law, this chapter was subject to a reform in 2011, partially  codifying 
previous case law and aiming at  clarifying certain issues.231  As to the procedural rules of international 
arbitration, there are few substantial modifications. The complete procedural autonomy of the parties is 
maintained, and even accentuated.232  The code in its reformed state is fully  applicable to arbitral 
proceedings on the basis of arbitration agreements that the parties concluded after 1 may 2011.233
Under Art. 1511 of the CPC,234  the arbitrator shall decide the dispute in accordance with the rules of 
law designated by  the parties. The arbitrator is bound by  his mission to resolve the dispute and to apply 
the law, but in contrast to national judges, no precise rules govern the ascertainment of the content of 
the applicable law for the arbitrators.235 Under Art. 1509, it is instead left to the parties, and by default 
the arbitrators, to fix the procedural rules. Regardless of which procedural rules are applied, the 
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arbitral tribunal must, under Art. 1510, guarantee the equality  of the parties and the principe de la 
contradiction, both considered to be principles of international procedural ordre public.236
It is a debated issue in France whether or not the arbitral tribunal has an obligation to research and ex 
officio apply legal provisions and principles that do not have the status of ordre public.237  However, 
ignoring the correct  legal provision only  amount to an error in law, which is not reason for setting 
aside an award or denying enforcement.238 It seems to be argued by  most legal authors that the parties 
have the primary responsibility  for ascertaining the applicable law and that the arbitrator have the 
discretion, but not the obligation, to make legal research and raise legal issues ex officio, subject to the 
principe de la contradiction.239
In France, the principe de la contradiction plays an important role also in international arbitration.240 If 
the principle is not respected, the award may  be set  aside under Art. 1520(4) of the CPC.241 Before the 
french arbitration reform of 2011, there was an explicit reference making Art. 16(3) of the CPC – 
stating that the principe de la contradiction applies also to points of law – applicable in international 
arbitration. With the reform, the choice of method is different. Art. 1510 now simply states that the 
arbitrators must respect the principe de la contradiction. However, nothing indicates that a material 
change is intended.242
The principle of contradiction applies also to legal basis.243  The result, confirmed in case law, of not 
giving the parties the opportunity to comment on the legal basis of the award, is that the award is set 
aside or refused enforcement.244  The principle is often strictly applied, as in recent case law from the 
Paris court of appeal, where an award was set aside because the arbitral tribunal had based it on a legal 
principle that was not explicitly  invoked, even though the principle had been discussed during the 
proceedings.245  Poudret and Besson have however argued – before the time of this more strict 
application of the principe de la contradiction – that in general, it seems to be admitted that the arbitral 
tribunal may rely on a legal basis that has only been implicitly included in the debates.246  This might 
still be the case where the legal basis is a principle so general it is considered to be implicitly included 
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and cannot reasonably  take a party by surprise.247  One such principle would be the French principle 
that a contract is interpreted in accordance with its spirit.248
One source of uncertainty  regarding the application of the principe de la contradiction is that it  is 
sometimes not entirely  clear exactly what should be subject to contradictory  debates.249 A recent ruling 
from the Cour de cassation demonstrates the difficulties in setting a boundary  between a legal source 
and a legal basis.250  In the case, the Cour de cassation applied the term legal question, question de 
droit. In its ruling, the court  refused to set aside an award in which the arbitral tribunal had motivated 
its decision by  referring to Polish case law and legal doctrine, which had not been subject to the 
parties’ discussions. The party  bringing the challenge action to the court claimed that the Polish case 
law in question was not merely a legal source but rather an autonomous legal basis, since it contained 
principles not expressed in the Polish statute of limitations. Nevertheless, the Cour de cassation stated 
that the issue of limitation-barring had been duly invoked by one party, and that it was therefore a legal 
question that had been subject to contradictory debate. The sources used in the arbitral tribunal’s 
motivation of the award were merely redundant affirmations of the actual motivation.251 The ruling has 
been subject to critique by  Chainais arguing that the Cour de cassation confused legal sources and 
legal basis.252
Finally, a line is drawn at the legal reasoning of the arbitral tribunal, which is not subject to the 
principle of contradiction.253  However, the factual and legal basis for the arbitral tribunal’s legal 
reasoning must be subject to contradictory debates.254
3.2.4 Switzerland
Swiss international arbitral procedure is governed by Chapter 12 of the LDIP. Art. 182 LDIP gives the 
parties, and by default the arbitrators, the power to determine the arbitral procedure. Whatever 
procedure chosen, the parties must, under LDIP 182(3) be treated equal and given the right  to be heard 
in an adversarial procedure. However, the Tribunal fédéral has ruled that  jura novit curia applies to 
international arbitration, formally obliging the arbitral tribunal to apply  the law ex officio.255 
Consequently, the tribunal also has the power to subsume the facts presented by  the parties under rules 
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that neither party has invoked or made reference to.256 As a result, deciding the dispute by applying a 
rule that has not  been invoked during the proceedings will not constitute grounds for setting aside the 
award on the basis of the tribunal having ruled ultra petita under Art. 190(c) LDIP.257  One exception to 
this rule is however made when a party, in its conclusions258 links its claims to a certain legal basis. In 
such case, the arbitral tribunal is bound by the legal basis referred to by the party, and may not allow 
the claim on another legal basis.259
Even though the Tribunal fédéral have stated that the arbitral tribunal is obliged to apply the law ex 
officio, erroneous application of the law, even in manifest cases, or non-application of the correct legal 
provision, is not cause for setting aside the award.260 The arbitral tribunal also has the power to impose 
the parties with a burden of proof of the content of the applicable law.261  Furthermore, the Tribunal 
fédéral has held that the arbitral tribunal is free to rely  entirely on the arguments of the parties, and is 
not obliged to research the applicable law itself, where it deems the parties’ presentations sufficient to 
decide the dispute.262 
Kaufman-Kohler, Pourdret and Besson argue that the arbitrators are in fact free to derogate from jura 
novit curia. Procedural matters are left to the discretion of the parties and, in default, to the arbitrators 
under Art. 182 LDIP. The only restriction of this discretion is the parties’ right to be heard under Art. 
182(3) LDIP. Since the question of how to ascertain the applicable law is a procedural matter left to the 
parties’ discretion, it is by default left  to the discretion of the arbitrators, whom are free to derogate 
from jura novit curia if they wish. The function of jura novit curia in Swiss arbitration law is rather to 
make sure that the award is not set aside if the arbitral tribunal should raise new legal issues ex officio, 
and not to actually oblige the tribunal to raise such issues.263
Finally, the parties’ right to be heard requires the arbitral tribunal to afford the parties an opportunity to 
comment on the legal research of the arbitral tribunal if it  includes the views of third parties, 
authorities, experts or institutes.264  As to the application of the law, the parties have the right to 
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comment if the tribunal is considering to base the award on an argument that the parties have not 
discussed, the application of which would be unforeseeable.265  Not giving the parties the opportunity 
to comment under such circumstances constitutes grounds for setting aside the award under Art. 190(d) 
LDIP, regardless of the effect on the outcome of the case.266  The assessment of the character of the 
new legal issue or argument as unforeseeable is left to the discretion of the arbitral tribunal, but it 
should be interpreted narrowly due to the international character of arbitration and in order to prevent a 
party’s right to be heard from being misused to obtain a material reexamination of the award.267 
Indeed, the doctrine of unforeseeability has been scarcely applied by the Tribunal fédéral.268
3.3 Institutional arbitration rules, conventions and other sources
Stepping away from national arbitration laws, this section contains analyses of arbitration soft law, 
institutional arbitration rules, arbitral awards and other relevant sources of international arbitration law.
3.3.1 Institutional arbitration rules and practice
Generally, institutional arbitration rules are silent on the matter of ascertainment of the applicable law, 
leaving the arbitral tribunal with considerable flexibility.269  The few provisions that  do address the 
issue of the substantive law often provide little or no guidance on how to ascertain its content.270
There is one important exception to this silence, Art. 22.1(c) of the London court of international 
arbitration rules of arbitration (LCIARoA):271
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22.1 Unless the parties at any time agree otherwise in writing, the Arbitral Tribunal shall have the power, on 
the application of any party or of its own motion, but in either case only after giving the parties a reasonable 
opportunity to state their views: 
(c) to conduct such enquiries as may appear to the Arbitral Tribunal to be necessary or expedient, including 
whether and to what extent the Arbitral Tribunal should itself take the initiative in identifying the issues and 
ascertaining the relevant facts and the law(s) or rules of law applicable to the arbitration, the merits of the 
parties’ dispute and the Arbitration Agreement.
The LCIARoA explicitly empowers the arbitral tribunal to make its own enquiries into the applicable 
law, under the condition of first having heard the parties.272 Apart from this, there is one more common 
denominator uniting most institutional arbitration rules: the parties’ right to present their case,273  and 
the obligation for the arbitral tribunal to render an enforceable award.274
As to the practice in arbitral tribunals, in an unreported ICC award dated 8 February 1994, case No. 
7071, the tribunal held that it was free to make its own research of the applicable law and to cite new 
sources in the award, as long as the parties had been given the opportunity  to make its submissions on 
the legal principles and provisions that those sources dealt with.275  Similarly, there are investment 
arbitration awards in which the arbitral tribunal have considered itself authorized to insert new legal 
arguments – as opposed to legal basis basis – in the award ex officio.276
In an investment arbitration award277  rendered under the SCC rules, the arbitral tribunal held that it 
was authorized to award indirect damages to a party that had only argued for direct  damages. The 
claimant had made a claim for direct damages to a company owned by him, based on Art. 226(2) of the 
Moldavian civil code, and had made a general reference to the bilateral investment treaty and other 
relevant investment law. The arbitrator requested the parties to make legal submissions on indirect 
damages under Moldavian law. In the award, the claimant was accorded indirect damages with the 
motivation that indirect damages were generally  accepted in the practice of investment arbitration. It 
should be noticed that the respondent was in procedural default. The sole arbitrator stated that:278
”this correction does not introduce a new relief that was not sought by the Claimants, nor a legal source that 
was not mentioned as legal basis for the proceedings or a fact that was not pleaded /.../ 
In respect of international arbitration taking place in Sweden,  it is sometimes suggested that the principle 
iura novit curia applies, but that the parties should be notified of the new legal sources introduced by the 
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arbitrator, so that they have the possibility to comment on them /.../ in the instant case,  the Arbitral Tribunal 
does not introduce a new legal source: it applies the legal sources invoked by the Claimant in a way different 
from the way pleaded by the Claimant. /.../ in respect of international disputes arbitrated in Sweden it is 
recognized that arbitrators should be able to present legal arguments on a rationale that neither party 
presented”
3.3.1.1 The UNCITRAL Arbitraiton Rules
In the latest revised version of the UNCITRAL Arbitration rules279  the issue of how to ascertain the 
applicable law has been addressed. The parties are required, under Art. 20(2)(e) and 21(2) to include 
the legal grounds and arguments supporting their claims and statements of defense. This is a 
modification compared to the original rules where no such requirement was made.280  In the travaux 
préparatoire, the modification is motivated by the fact that there is an uncertainty as to whether the 
parties are obliged to present legal grounds and arguments for their claims, caused by  the differences in 
which this issue is addressed in different legal cultures. Removing this uncertainty favored 
predictability of the arbitral procedure.281 The UNCITRAL arbitration rules do not provide any further 
guidance on the matter of how to ascertain and apply the lex contractus. 
3.3.2 Conventions and other sources
3.3.2.1 The New York Convention
One of the overriding duties of the arbitral tribunal is to render an enforceable award.282 Consequently, 
the New York Convention, which is ratified by over 100 states and concerns the issue of international 
enforceability  of arbitral awards, sets an indirect minimum procedural standard for the arbitral tribunal 
by providing the grounds on which the contracting states may deny recognition and enforcement of an 
award from another contracting state.283
Under Art. V(2)(b), an award may  be refused enforcement where it is contrary to public policy in the 
state of enforcement. This ground may also refer to procedural public policy: a breach due process or 
natural justice. However, a serious irregularity  is required in order to deem it contrary to public 
policy.284  Under Art. V(1)(b), not giving the parties the opportunity to present their case is also 
grounds for refusing enforcement of an award. In a way, the two grounds for refusal connect: the 
opportunity to present ones case is a question of procedural ordre public and the most important due 
process rule.285  The requirement of giving both parties the opportunity to present their case is often 
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expressed through the maxim audi alteram partem, the objective of which is to allow both parties to 
present their case from their subjective point of view.286
Under the New York Convention, an error in law is not a ground to refuse recognition or enforcement 
of an arbitral award.
3.3.2.2 UNCITRAL Model Law
The model law does not contain any explicit conditions on how to ascertain the applicable law. Art. 19 
gives the arbitral tribal a substantial liberty in determining the rules of procedure:
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Law, the parties are free to agree on the procedure to be followed by the 
arbitral tribunal in conducting the proceedings.
(2) Failing such agreement, the arbitral tribunal may, subject to the provisions of this Law, conduct the 
arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate. The power conferred upon the arbitral tribunal 
includes the power to determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of any evidence.
The Model law however contains some procedural safeguards that may  be of relevance to the issue. 
Art. 18 of the Model law states that: 
”each party shall be given a full opportunity of presenting his case.”
Art. 23(3) also states that: 
All statements, documents or other information supplied to the arbitral tribunal by one party shall be 
communicated to the other party. Also any expert report or evidentiary document on which the arbitral 
tribunal may rely in making its decision shall be communicated to the parties.
3.3.2.3 ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of transnational civil procedure
The Principles of transnational civil procedure (ALI/UNIDROIT Principles), developed by  a joint 
study group with members from the International institute for the unification of private law and the 
American law institute, is a text that aims at being a set of standards for adjudication of transnational 
commercial disputes, applicable also to arbitration.287 
Under Art. 22.1 of the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles the court is responsible for determining the correct 
legal basis for its decisions, also when foreign law applies. When carrying out this responsibility, the 
court may appoint an expert under Art. 22.4. The court may also, under Art. 22.2 and 22.3, rely  on a 
legal theory that has not been advanced by the parties, after having afforded the parties an opportunity 
to be comment.
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3.3.2.4 The ILA recommendations288
In 2008, the Committee on International Commercial Arbitration addressed the issue of ascertaining 
the content of the applicable law in international commercial arbitration. The conference held in Rio de 
Janeiro 17-21 August, resulted in a recommendation on how an arbitral tribunal should ascertain the 
content of the applicable law.
According to the ILA recommendations, where the substantive law of the contract must be applied, the 
arbitrators should always discuss the issue of how to ascertain its contents with the parties.289  The 
arbitrators should also bear in mind that national laws on the topic might  not be suitable to apply in 
arbitration proceedings and the arbitrators should not rely on any unexpressed presumptions on 
similarity with another law.290
The arbitrators should primarily  rely  on the parties for information on the applicable law’s contents.291 
They  should not introduce any legal issues – propositions of law that may bear on the outcome of the 
dispute – ex officio, except where the legal issue concerns matters of ordre public.292  The reason for 
this point of view is that, although many  jurisdictions accord the power to the arbitrators raise legal 
issues ex officio, the arbitral tribunal could be accused for exceeding its mandate if it based its decision 
on a legal rule not invoked by  the parties.293  Nevertheless, special circumstances, like procedural 
default of a party or expedited interim relief proceedings, may justify the arbitrator to take a more 
active role.294  Should the arbitral tribunal, due to such special circumstances, raise a legal issue ex 
officio, it should always give the parties the opportunity to comment.295
As to legal research, the arbitrators may  question the parties on legal issues and sources. They may 
also review sources not invoked by  the parties relating to legal issues already raised and may  in a 
transparent way rely on their own knowledge.296  If any sources not invoked by the parties are relied 
on, the parties must be given the opportunity to comment on them, at least where these sources go 
meaningfully beyond the ones already invoked. However, should the new sources only reinforce those 
already invoked, it is not necessary to invite the parties to comment. The key issue is not to take the 
parties by surprise.297
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The arbitrators should consider reopening the proceedings if, during the course of deliberations, a need 
for further ascertaining the applicable law is discovered.298  Finally, should it not be possible to 
sufficiently ascertain the contents of the applicable law even after diligent efforts, the arbitrators may 
apply the rules they deem appropriate while affording the parties an opportunity to comment.299
3.4 Summarizing conclusions of comparative outlook
After having studied the national jurisdictions of Sweden, England, France and Switzerland, as well as 
other sources of international arbitration law, can any  general conclusions be drawn? Are there any 
common denominators of how an arbitral tribunal should ascertain and apply the lex contractus under 
the arbitration laws of the different jurisdictions?
3.4.1 Principles governing ascertainment and application of law in national courts unsuitable in 
international arbitration
On one hand, every  jurisdiction’s arbitration law when it comes to ascertaining the content of the lex 
contractus seems to be influenced by the rules applied in national courts to some extent. One example 
of this is that in England, case law shows that the applicable law may be treated as fact and presumed 
to have the same content as English law. The scant Swedish appeal court practice also confirm that it 
seems natural for the the national courts in challenge actions to presume that the same principles apply 
in international arbitration as in national courts. 
On the other, the arbitration laws of the different jurisdictions seem to have more in common with each 
other than with the the rules applied in national courts. A clear example of this is EAA Art. 34(1) and 
(2)(g) which clearly  gives the arbitral tribunal a power – shared by  arbitrators under French and Swiss 
law – that an English national judge does not posses.
One conclusion that may  be drawn from this, which also has support in legal literature, is that  national 
rules on how to ascertain and apply the content  of the law are not suitable to apply in international 
arbitration. One important reason is that an arbitral tribunal has no lex fori to fall back on.300 This view 
seems to be the general view in Swedish legal literature as well: The international character of 
arbitration must affect the way the law is ascertained and applied.
3.4.2 Duty or discretion to ascertain the content of the applicable law
The power of the arbitral tribunal to research the applicable law seems almost  universally  accepted. 
The national arbitration laws of England, France and Switzerland, the LCIARoA Art. 22(1)(c), 
arbitration practice under the ICC and SCC rules, the ALI/UNIDROIT principles and the ILA 
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recommendations all accord this power to the arbitrators. This seems to be the case also in Sweden, 
although there is no consensus in the legal literature.
However, under no national arbitration law, institutional rules or other piece of soft law is the arbitral 
tribunal obliged to ascertain the law itself. Swiss international arbitration law, under which the 
arbitrators might have such a duty  if the parties’ submissions are insufficient, could be the exception. 
The power of the arbitral tribunal to burden the parties with the responsibility  of ascertaining the 
applicable law is universally excepted. English, French and Swiss case law, as well as the ALI/
UNIDROIT principles, the ILA recommendations, and the UNICTRAL arbitration rules all support 
this. Requesting the parties to ascertain the content of the applicable law seems to be accepted also 
under Swedish law, judging from the views of most legal authors. 
Thus, there seems to be a broad international support for an order where the parties are primarily 
responsible for ascertaining the content of the applicable law and where the arbitrators are free, but not 
obliged, to proceed by requiring further legal submissions or in a transparent manner conduct its own 
legal research. Legal authors from both civil and common law jurisdictions confirm this view.301 
3.4.3 Duty or discretion to raise legal issues ex officio
Under the national arbitration laws, the duty or discretion to apply  the law ex officio seems to correlate 
the principles of how the applicable law is ascertained: If the arbitral tribunal has the power to research 
the law, it also has some kind of power raise legal issues ex officio. Under French and English law, the 
arbitral tribunal has a discretion, but no duty, raise legal issues ex officio. Swiss law affords a smaller 
amount of freedom to the arbitral tribunal. Under Swiss arbitration law, it is more uncertain whether 
researching and applying the law is a discretion or a duty. Nevertheless, the failure to apply  an 
applicable legal provision does not constitute grounds for setting aside the award under Swiss law. 
Interestingly  enough though, when a party connects its claims to a legal basis in its conclusions, the 
arbitral tribunal is bound by the legal rules invoked. 
In Swedish law, the power of the tribunal to raise legal issues ex officio is a much more uncertain issue. 
It should be kept in mind that different legal authors suggests different legal solutions. The most 
broadly  favored interpretation however seem to be that there is no duty  for the arbitral tribunal to raise 
legal issues ex officio. Sticking to the parties’ arguments with the result of applying the wrong legal 
provision is probably only an error in law, and not  cause for setting aside the award. It also seems, at 
least when judging from the Svea appeal court cases discussing jura novit curia, that the arbitral 
tribunal has the power to raise points of law ex officio. As we have seen, there are also legal authors 
who argue that this is the case.
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Turning to other sources of arbitration law, the power of the arbitral tribunal to raise legal issues ex 
officio is confirmed by LCIARoA 22.1(c), under the ALI/UNIDROIT principles Art. 22.2 as well as in 
investment arbitration practice under the SCC rules. Interestingly enough, according to the ILA 
recommendation, the arbitrator should not introduce any new legal issues.
When looking for answers in international legal doctrine it  however seems that there is an extensive 
support, from both common law302 and civil law 303  authors, that the arbitrators should have the power 
to raise legal issues ex officio.
3.4.4 The parties’ right to be heard on points of law and legal sources
One difficulty  regarding the parties’ right to be heard on points of law is the question of exactly  what it 
is that the parties have the right to comment on. For the purpose of the discussion below, a distinction 
is made between legal sources and legal issues. The former referring to the sources from which legal 
rules are derived and the latter to the legal rules themselves and how they are applied, i.e. which legal 
basis applies and how facts are qualified legally under this legal basis.
One difficulty  when comparing the parties’ right to be heard – and the arbitrators’ corresponding 
obligation to give notice – on legal basis, is that no uniform terminology is used in the debate. Legal 
issues, points of law, legal basis, rules of law, legal principles or provisions, legal theories and legal 
arguments are terms that are all used when discussing what it  is that the parties have a right to 
comment on. That a distinction is not always made between deciding a case on a new legal basis and 
on a new construction with a legal basis already  referred to by a party, also causes difficulties in 
analyzing the parties right to be heard on points of law..304
Starting with legal sources that only deal with rules of law that already have been discussed by the 
parties, and that do not suggest a different application of these rules, only  English law seem to oppose 
that such sources are cited by the arbitrators without giving the parties an opportunity  to comment. 
However, as the citing of such a source does not cause any substantial injustice, doing so will not 
constitute grounds for setting aside the award under English law. The ILA position is that the content 
of legal sources that go meaningfully beyond the ones invoked by the parties must be communicated to 
the parties.
48
302  See e.g.  Lew (2011) p.  15, Park (JIDS 2010), p. 42 et seq and Waincymer (Journ. Int’l Arb. 2011) p. 220. Waincymer 
even argues that it should not be considered as a discretion, but an obligation of the arbitrators to accurately apply the law 
in certain situations.
303  See e.g. Kaufman-Kohler (Arb. Int’l,  2005) p. 636, Dimolitsa (ASA Bulletin 2009), p. 431 and Chainais (Rev. Arb. 
2010) pp. 43-44.
304 Petrochilos (2004) p.146.
In Switzerland, the Tribunal fédéral has declared that the parties have the right to comment on legal 
arguments, the application of which the parties can not reasonably  foresee. In French international 
arbitration law, the legal reasoning, including the sources cited, are not subject to the principe de la 
contradiction, only the legal basis for the parties’ claims and defenses are. However, the application of 
the principe de la contradiction seems to be strict in France, requiring that  a legal basis has been 
explicitly invoked by  a party in order for the tribunal to base its award on it without giving notice to 
the parties. Under English arbitration law, the adversarial principle is upheld in relation to all points of 
law and the parties must be afforded the opportunity to comment on both new legal basis and new 
legal constructions under a legal basis that has already been invoked. When comparing with Swedish 
law, there seem to exist a considerable difference in this respect. Although many Swedish legal authors 
on the subject argue that it  is recommendable to afford the parties an opportunity to comment on points 
of law raised ex officio, most do not seem to consider it a duty for the arbitral tribunal the non-respect 
of which would be a reason for setting aside the award. In the existing appeal court case law, the 
question is not brought up  to discussion by the court. There are however prominent authors who argue 
that not giving the parties an opportunity to comment on points of law raised ex officio may constitute 
grounds for setting aside the award. That the parties should not be surprised by the application of the 
law is also emphasized in the preparatory works to the SAA.
Common for English, French and Swiss arbitration law is that they all limit the situations where an 
award may  be set aside due to non-respect of the parties’ right to be heard on points of law. Even 
though raising a  point of law ex officio without inviting the parties to comment might be considered a 
procedural irregularity, this irregularity must have had a real effect on the dispute’s outcome in order 
for an award to be set aside in England. In Switzerland, an element  of surprise is required and in 
France, different legal constructions within the legal basis already  invoked are excluded from the 
principe de la contradiction. 
Turning to other sources of arbitration law, a right for the parties to comment on different aspects of 
the applicable law when raised ex officio is confirmed: ICC practice speaks of a right to comment on 
legal provisions and principles, the ALI/UNIDROIT principles speak of a right to comment on legal 
theories and the ILA recommendations legal issues. In international commercial arbitration literature, 
there also seem to exist  a widespread support for an obligation for the arbitral tribunal to afford the 
parties an opportunity to comment on the applicable law when researched and applied ex officio.305 
This implies that the arbitrators should not hesitate to reopen the proceedings if they consider it 
necessary.306
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There are however authors who are of a different opinion, arguing that giving the parties an 
opportunity to comment on legal issues raised ex officio is not an obligation for the arbitral tribunal.307 
As we can see, there is no consensus as to exactly  what the parties have the right to comment on. The 
vast majority  of the sources of international arbitration law and all three jurisdictions, except Sweden, 
however agree that the parties have some kind of right to comment on points of law raised ex officio, 
and that a serious enough violation of this right  constitutes grounds for setting aside an award. The 
underlying principle seem to be that the parties must not be taken by surprise, and that the legal basis 
of the award should be subject to contradictory  debates. A distinction seem to exist between legal basis 
– the actual rule of law applied, whether originating from statute, case law or general legal principles – 
and legal sources. Yet, as French case law shows, it is difficult to draw an exact line between the two, a 
court ruling might for example be both: a legal source and a legal rule originating from case law. If 
some common denominator may be identified it is that the parties have the right to comment on any 
legal issue raised ex officio and on legal sources that go meaningfully beyond the ones already 
invoked. However, the tribunal’s interpretation of legal sources and its legal reasoning – including 
corroborations and reinforcement of legal constructions within the limits of legal basis and sources 
already invoked – generally seem to be excluded from the parties’ right to comment.
3.4.5 Transnational principles on how to ascertain and apply the law in international arbitration?
After having compared the arbitration laws of England, France, Sweden and Switzerland, as well as 
having studied international arbitration rules and soft law, it  is clear that the arbitral tribunal enjoys a 
considerable freedom in how to ascertain the applicable law. It is also clear that there are differences in 
the way the law is ascertained in the four jurisdictions. The practice of national courts generally  seem 
to affect international arbitral practice to some extent and there is therefore no universal arbitral 
practice. Nevertheless, beyond these differences, there seem to exist some common denominators that 
unite all the four jurisdictions and most arbitration soft law, as well as opinions of legal writers. Some 
authors even argue that these common denominators are submerging principles of transnational arbitral 
procedure.308 The principles are:
1. The parties bear the primary responsibility for ascertaining the content of the applicable law.
2. The arbitral tribunal has a discretionary power to ascertain the content of the applicable law itself in a 
transparent manner.
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3. The arbitral tribunal is not formally bound by the parties’  legal arguments or legal basis invoked, nor is 
the arbitral tribunal obliged to raise legal issues ex officio. 
4. If the arbitral tribunal makes use of its power to ascertain the applicable law or to raise new legal 
issues, it has an obligation to afford the parties an opportunity to comment:
- on legal sources if they go meaningfully beyond the sources invoked by the parties;
- on legal qualifications of facts that neither party has argued for, and;
- on legal rules, provisions or principles applied ex officio.
Could these principles be applied also in international commercial arbitration in Sweden?
4. PRINCIPLES GOVERNING ARBITRAL PROCEDURE IN SWEDEN
Below, the conclusions of the comparative study will form the basis of a discussion from a Swedish 
perspective. First, policy arguments relating to jura novit curia will be discussed in the context of 
international arbitration. Second, the principles from subparagraph 3.3.5. will be examined in the light 
of other guiding principles of international arbitration in Sweden.
4.1 Policy arguments
As stated above, there are two main reasons for applying jura novit curia in Swedish law. The first, the 
will to produce precedents and a uniform application of the law, is primarily  connected to a courts’ 
social function and does not hold much weight in international commercial arbitration, which rests 
mainly on a contractual basis.309  In addition to that, an arbitral award holds no authority  over how 
courts apply the law, and the confidential character of arbitration results in awards rarely  being made 
public. Being a private form of dispute settlement, arbitration is therefore scarcely intended, nor 
suitable, for contributing to a uniform application of the law.
The second policy  reason for jura novit curia is to protect  a party  who fails to invoke the correct legal 
basis for its claims. In international commercial arbitration, the parties should however be considered 
to have an equal opportunity  to engage and finance legal representation and to present legal arguments. 
Furthermore, the principle of party autonomy gives the parties the power to exclude jura novit curia 
from application. Consequently, protecting the parties from an erroneous application of the law has not 
been an important consideration in international commercial arbitration.310 
In this light, it seems that the policy  arguments for jura novit curia do not hold much weight in 
international commercial arbitration. It rather seems that the policy arguments for a more adversarial 
approach to the application of the law – focusing on dispute settlement and procedural justice – have 
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more relevance. This indicates, at the very least, that the arbitral tribunal should not be under any 
obligation to research the law or to raise legal issues ex officio.
An outcome that is substantially  in accordance with the applicable law must however be considered as 
predictable. The fact that an arbitral award cannot be appealed, nor reviewed on its merits is therefore 
sometimes given as an argument for applying jura novit curia, which is seen as a guarantee for a 
predicable resolution to the dispute in accordance with the applicable law.311  There are also surveys 
that show that the most important thing for parties to international arbitration disputes generally is a 
correct and just  outcome to the dispute, this is even ranked higher than receipt of a monetary  award, 
speed of outcome, cost and expertise of the arbitrators.312 
But does the application of jura novit curia enhance the chances of finding a solution in accordance 
with the applicable law? Such an argument clearly  rests on the assumption that with the help  of the 
arbitrators, it is more likely that  the correct legal outcome is found. An argument of this kind is 
convincing in a dispute settlement model where the adjudicator is required to have legal training,313 
and where a weaker party might need to be protected from its own ignorance of the law. None of this is 
generally  the case in international commercial arbitration.314  Even if some members of the arbitral 
tribunal might be experts on the applicable law, most will probably  not be. The parties’ counsels 
however most certainly will.315  Thus, the arbitrators might not be more likely to find a correct legal 
solution to an international commercial arbitration dispute, than the parties’ legal representatives.
Undeniably though, should both parties present incorrect legal arguments, giving the arbitral tribunal 
the power to apply a different legal solution, rather than choosing between two incorrect ones, does 
increase the chances of a substantially correct legal solution. From the point of view of finding a 
correct legal outcome to the dispute, there are however no convincing arguments against obliging the 
arbitrators to give the parties an opportunity to comment on any points of law raised ex officio. There 
is always a risk that the arbitrators may misinterpret the applicable law – this risk exists even in 
national courts with legally  trained judges, as appeals are sometimes successful. Giving the parties an 
opportunity to comment on points of law would only aid the arbitral tribunal’s legal reasoning and 
increase the chance of finding a substantially correct legal outcome to the dispute.
Seen from another perspective, the lack of possibility  to review the award on the merits – a guarantee 
of substantive justice – also increases the importance of procedural safeguards and the respect for 
procedural fairness in order to assure procedural justice.
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To conclude, there are no convincing policy  arguments for obliging an arbitrator in international 
commercial arbitration to research the law and apply  legal provisions ex officio. If however a 
substantially  correct outcome of the dispute is sought, accepting a power of the arbitral tribunal to raise 
new legal issues while obliging it to afford the parties an opportunity to comment, would be 
appropriate. 
4.2 Principles governing international arbitration in Sweden
Below, the results of the comparative study  will be discussed in the light of principles and arbitral 
duties that govern the arbitral proceedings under Swedish arbitration law.
4.2.1 Procedural safeguards
Under Section 24 of the SAA, the parties must be accorded the possibility  to present their case. This is 
the most important principle of the arbitral procedure and requires that the procedure is managed in 
such a way that the parties are not subjected to surprises of any kind.316  Arbitration may only be 
accepted as a dispute resolution instrument if it is predictable and transparent. Both parties must 
therefore be given the opportunity to present their case and the chance to convince the arbitrators of 
the accuracy in their points of view by presenting their arguments.317  In order to respect the parties’ 
right to present  their case, the parties should be informed of everything upon which the arbitrators base 
the award.318
The main issue related to the parties’ right to present their case, in relation to ascertaining and applying 
the content of the applicable law, is the question whether the arbitrators are obliged to give the parties 
an opportunity to comment on points of law raised ex officio. From the viewpoint of procedural 
fairness, there is no reason not to let the parties comment on legal issues raised ex officio – including 
both legal basis and legal constructions within a legal basis – and legal sources, without any distinction 
between cases that are unexpected or surprising and cases that  are not. Obliging the tribunal to give the 
parties an opportunity to comment would enhance predictability and transparency  of the arbitral 
procedure. The only  argument to the contrary would be that the right to present ones case is limited to 
factual matters. Such an argument cannot be accepted in international arbitration, as the principle of 
party autonomy allows the parties to dispose of the application of the law.
Not affording the parties the opportunity to present their case is seen as a procedural irregularity  and 
constitutes grounds for setting aside the award under SAA section 34(6), if it  is probable that the 
irregularity has affected the outcome of the case. It is the party  who challenges the award that has the 
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burden of proof for the causation between the irregularity  and the outcome.319  Should the irregularity 
be of a serious kind, causation is however presumed.320  Nevertheless, it is uncertain if not letting the 
parties comment on legal issues raised ex officio is a procedural irregularity under Swedish arbitration 
law. On one hand, many  legal authors suggest that it is, on the other, appeal court case law suggests 
that it is not. Whatever the case may be, from an international perspective ”it is certainly not good 
practice” to decide a dispute on a legal basis that the parties have not discussed during the proceedings 
without first affording them an opportunity to comment.321
4.2.2 Impartiality
Another important principle, expressed in the SAA under section 8 and 21, is the duty  of the arbitrators 
to remain and appear impartial, and for the arbitral tribunal to manage the proceedings in an impartial 
manner. Circumstances that may diminish confidence in an arbitrator’s impartiality is enough to 
consider an arbitrator as partial. Under section 8(3), such a circumstance is e.g. when an arbitrator 
takes a position to a matter in dispute during the proceedings or assists one of the parties.322
The issue of impartiality is relevant since raising a point of law ex officio will inevitably favor one 
party  more than the other. If raising legal issues is considered a discretion and not a duty, it raises 
issues of impartiality. On one hand the arbitral tribunal’s mission is to apply the law in order to resolve 
the dispute, and doing so ex officio can hardly be seen as impartial if it  is done in a consistent manner 
throughout the proceedings without regard of which party  a certain legal provision benefits. On the 
other hand, the communication of a legal provision to the parties might be perceived as partial by the 
party  who is disadvantaged by it. However, if the parties are requested to comment on the application 
of a certain legal provision, or a legal source, without the arbitral tribunal disclosing arguments in any 
direction, wherein lies the perceived partiality? Can communicating a legal provision that could be 
relevant to the dispute – within the limits of the invoked facts and the parties’ claims, prayers for relief 
and statements of defense – justifiably be perceived as partial? After having been brought up by the 
tribunal, the parties will have an equal opportunity  to present arguments regarding the applicability of 
the legal provision, this will not the case if the legal provision is applied without first inviting the 
parties to comment.323  If the arbitral tribunal, when a legal issue arises, declares that  it will 
communicate possibly relevant legal issues to the parties, and – unless the parties agree otherwise – 
proceeds and requests the parties to comment on the legal issue at hand, surely this cannot be 
perceived as partial.
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4.2.3 Principle of party autonomy
As stated above, the SAA is based on the principle of party autonomy, giving the parties the power to 
exclude the application of jura novit curia. Since procedural issues left to the parties’ discretion in 
default is left to the arbitrators’ discretion, the natural point  of departure seems to be that the arbitral 
tribunal’s power to research the law and raise legal issues ex officio is a discretional matter, unless 
strong enough reasons would indicate otherwise. Furthermore – and this has in Swedish legal literature 
been pointed out as the most important  consequence of the principle of party autonomy324 – the arbitral 
tribunal must give the parties notice before making use of these default  powers. Consequently, if the 
arbitral tribunal conducts legal research or raises legal issues ex officio, it must be done in a transparent 
manner. The discussion on the principle of party  autonomy also overlaps on many areas with the next 
subparagraph, the arbitral tribunal’s duty to respect the mission as defined by the parties.
4.2.4 Duty to complete and respect the mission
The arbitral tribunal’s mission consists in resolving the dispute before it  on the basis of the applicable 
law. It is clear that if an arbitral tribunal without valid reason disregards the parties’ choice of law, and 
applies another body  of law, it exceeds its authority.325  This also constitutes grounds for setting aside 
the award under SAA section 34(2). This thesis is however not focused on questions of choice of law, 
so the question is: What are the limits of the arbitral tribunal’s mission in applying the law chosen by 
the parties?
Starting with the ascertainment of the applicable law, the arbitrators are free to impose this burden on 
the parties. The practical benefits of requiring the parties to ascertain the law are considerable and 
there seem to be no interdiction under Swedish law against the arbitral tribunal doing so. In its mission 
to interpret the law, the arbitral tribunal should review the sources presented by  the parties, and the 
tribunal is free to make its own interpretation of these sources. Should the tribunal consider that the 
law is not sufficiently  ascertained, the tribunal should request the parties to produce more legal 
material. However, a burden of proof of the content of the applicable law, resulting in the arbitral 
tribunal rejecting claims or defenses of a party who fails to ascertain the content of the applicable law 
does not seem suitable to apply in international arbitration. Unexpected events, e.g. civil war, in the 
jurisdiction of the applicable law may render the ascertainment of the applicable law unreasonably 
difficult. Neither should the arbitral tribunal proceed to apply another law if the parties fails to 
establish the content of law they have chosen. If the parties fail to establish the content of the legal 
provisions they invoke, the arbitral tribunal should, in order to respect its mission, make reasonable 
efforts to establish the content of the law itself, whether by appointing a legal expert or by making its 
own legal research. Only if this proves to be unreasonably difficult or complicated should the 
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arbitrators proceed and apply another body of law to the dispute, the exact method of how this should 
be done however falls outside the scope of this thesis.
As to the issue of the tribunal’s application of the law, the question is if the tribunal should stick to the 
arguments and legal basis presented by the parties, or, in the event that the tribunal considers that a 
legal basis should be applied in a different way, or that  a different legal basis should be applied, if the 
tribunal may raise this legal issue ex officio. The main problem generally seem to be pointed out as the 
different approaches of civil law and common law to this issue. Although this is true in relation to civil 
litigation, we have seen that it is not entirely the case when it comes to arbitration.
Starting with Swedish law, we have seen that in failure to apply  the correct legal provision or an 
incorrect application of a legal provision, will not constitute grounds for setting aside the award. So, if 
there is a duty  to apply legal rules ex officio and to give correct legal qualifications to facts, it is 
unsanctioned, and not a duty in the strict sense of the word.
Could the situation be the opposite, that the arbitral tribunal is bound by the parties’ legal arguments? 
The preparatory works point out that when defining the tribunal’s authority in international arbitration, 
the parties’ legal backgrounds must be taken into consideration. Does this mean that if two parties with 
common law backgrounds would chose to arbitrate their dispute in Stockholm, the arbitral tribunal 
would implicitly be bound to apply only the legal basis invoked by the parties? Well, even if an 
English court (which is the common law jurisdiction subject  to study) might be bound by the parties’ 
legal arguments, an international arbitral tribunal with its seat in England is, as we have seen, not. And 
for an international arbitral tribunal with its seat  in Stockholm to tacitly  adopt procedural rules from 
English civil litigation seems farfetched. The parties have chosen arbitration to settle their dispute and 
not litigation, so why apply litigation rules? Should the jurisdictions where the parties come from deal 
with this issue in two different ways, the problem undeniably gets even more complicated. 
For these reasons, deciding how the applicable law is to be ascertained based on the parties’ legal 
backgrounds seems neither predictable, nor transparent. Instead of taking the parties’ legal 
backgrounds into account in each specific case, considering different legal cultures in abstract  would 
allow a predictable solution. The result of the comparative outlook offers such a solution.
Leaving the parties’ legal backgrounds, and turning instead to their procedural acts and measures 
during the arbitral proceedings, can, in the light of the principle of party  autonomy, the parties’ legal 
argumentation be considered as a part of their agreement setting limits for the tribunal’s mission? Well, 
under Swedish procedural principles, the parties’ acts and measures during the proceedings do not 
follow general rules on how the parties enter into an agreement. One party’s failure to object to a legal 
qualification made or an invoked legal basis is not interpreted as a tacit acceptance that  concludes an 
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agreement between the parties on the legal qualification or basis in question.326 This should apply also 
to arbitral proceedings. But even if the parties’ actions during the proceeding should not  be interpreted 
as tacit agreements on how the law should be applied, the principle of party autonomy requires the 
arbitrators to be responsive to the legal argumentation of the parties. Where a party  admits to the 
applicability of a certain legal basis or to a certain legal argument or qualification made by  the other 
party, the arbitrators should not apply the law differently or apply  another legal basis. Furthermore, 
where both parties clearly argue from a common conception of legal qualifications of facts or 
applicable legal basis, there are strong reasons for the arbitral tribunal not to raise other legal issues ex 
officio. These considerations are reflections of the principle of party  autonomy and the parties’ right to 
control the legal frames of the dispute.
Where there is no such common perception, the parties’ unilateral procedural acts, such as invoked 
legal basis and the way in which a legal provision is applied, should not be interpreted as constituting 
the legal limits of the dispute. The tribunal should in this situation, if it  considers that another legal 
basis is applicable or an invoked legal basis is applicable in a different way, raise these legal issues ex 
officio. The tribunal should not be obliged to simply chose between the least  incorrect of two legal 
solutions.
In the light of the arguments presented above, it seems that, combined with the parties bearing the 
responsibility for ascertaining the content of the applicable law, a discretionary power of the arbitral 
tribunal to raise legal issues ex officio would be compatible with the principle of party autonomy under 
Swedish arbitration law, it is a solution that is acceptable in different legal cultures, as the preparatory 
works requires.
4.2.5 Duty to render a valid and enforceable award
Flowing from the duty to handle the dispute in a practical manner under section 21 of the SAA and 
also inherent in the arbitral tribunal’s mission, is the duty to render a valid and enforceable award.327 
Except for the grounds for setting the award aside under the SAA, which are mainly discussed under 
the other subparagraphs of this chapter, international arbitral awards may often be executed in other 
jurisdictions than the one of the arbitral seat. Which ones are however difficult to predict. 
As stated above, in many jurisdictions, not inviting the parties to comment on points of law might be a 
ground for refusing enforcement or recognition of the award under the New York Convention Art. V(1)
(b) and V(2)(b). National courts are often allowed to exercise strict control to make sure that due 
process is respected in the arbitral proceedings in other jurisdictions.328
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The analysis of the parties’ right to be heard in England, France, Switzerland and in other sources of 
arbitration law shows that there is a risk that  an award is refused enforcement if the parties are not 
given the opportunity to comment on points of law raised ex officio. Due to the difficulty in predicting 
the place of enforcement of an award and the different scopes of this right in different jurisdictions, 
uniform principles that are acceptable in most jurisdictions would instead be a both practical and 
predictable approach defining the scope of the parties’ right to comment on points of law. Giving the 
parties the right to comment on legal sources that go meaningfully beyond the ones invoked and on all 
legal issues raised ex officio seems to be a principle that would enjoy such transnational acceptance.
4.2.6 Duty to handle the dispute in a speedy manner
The arbitral tribunal’s duty  to handle the dispute in a speedy manner under section 21 of the SAA is an 
argument against the tribunal conducting its own legal research – which could be lengthly – in order to 
investigate if any rules that neither party has invoked could be applicable to the dispute. The cost 
aspect of the proceedings is also an argument against the arbitral tribunal conducting its own research. 
At least where it is paid on hourly basis.329  This is in line with not obliging the arbitral tribunal to 
ascertain the applicable law itself.
As to an obligation of the tribunal to afford the parties an opportunity to comment on legal issues 
raised ex officio, the duty to handle the dispute in a speedy manner demands that  the parties are only 
given the opportunity to comment when it is required by other superior principles. Such principles are 
the right to present ones case, the principle of party autonomy and the duty to render an enforceable 
award. Excluding legal sources that merely  confirm or reinforce the ones invoked by  the parties and 
the arbitral tribunal’s own legal reasoning from what the parties should be given the right to comment 
on therefore seems appropriate.
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5. RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW TO ASCERTAIN AND APPLY THE LAW 
IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN SWEDEN
The question of whether jura novit curia applies, or should apply, in international commercial 
arbitration cannot be answered with a simple yes or no. The meaning of the principle is too vague. It 
includes various considerations regarding the allocation of duties, responsibilities and powers between 
the adjudicator and the parties. The principle is also closely related to the parties’ right to be heard on 
points of law which may limit the adjudicator’s power to apply the law ex officio. As we have seen, 
jura novit curia applies differently  – or not at all – in different  jurisdictions. It  may also apply 
differently within the same jurisdiction whether lex fori or foreign law is applied. To put it in other 
words: there is no uniform conception of jura novit curia. The question whether the principle should 
apply  to international commercial arbitration in Sweden instead has to be divided into several 
subordinate questions.
The ascertainment of the applicable law
In international commercial arbitration in Sweden, the parties should be responsible for ascertaining 
the content of the applicable law and the arbitral tribunal has no general obligation to conduct legal 
research. In order to complete its mission, the arbitral tribunal must however acquire enough 
knowledge of the applicable law to apply it. Thus, where the parties fail to sufficiently ascertain the 
content of the lex contractus, the arbitrators should primarily request the parties to make further 
submissions on the content of the applicable law. Should the applicable law’s content still need further 
ascertainment, the arbitral tribunal may, in a transparent manner, proceed with its own research or 
appoint a legal expert. It  should however normally be considered as falling outside the scope of the 
arbitral tribunal’s mission to conduct its own legal research for the only purpose of clarifying if 
alternative legal basis may be applicable to the dispute. In its interpretation and application of the law, 
the arbitral tribunal should review the sources presented by the parties. The tribunal is free to make 
different interpretations of these sources than the parties. 
Discretionary power to raise legal issues ex officio
Where both parties argue from a common perception of what legal basis apply  to the facts of the 
dispute and possibly also how the facts should be interpreted legally, there are strong reasons for the 
arbitral tribunal not to apply the law differently than argued for by the parties. 
However, where the parties argue from different perceptions of which legal basis apply, refer to several 
legal basis or are not in agreement of the legal qualification of facts, the tribunal should not simply 
chose the least incorrect alternative if it considers another solution and other arguments to be correct. 
In this situation, the arbitral tribunal may, as a part of its mission, raise the legal issues it considers 
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necessary  to resolve the dispute and make its own legal interpretation of facts, subject to the parties’ 
right to comment on points of law.
The need to remain flexible and to adapt a suitable solution depending on the character of the legal 
issues and the composition of the arbitral tribunal is paramount in this situation. The tribunal may  be 
well accustomed with the applicable law or may not know it  at all. The insufficient ascertainment of 
the applicable law may depend on inadvertence of the parties or of difficulties related to a certain 
jurisdiction.
The parties’ right to comment on points of law
Whenever the arbitral tribunal, as a result of its own research or knowledge of the applicable law, 
considers to make use of legal sources that materially differs from the ones invoked by the parties, to 
apply  the law differently than argued for by the parties or to apply a legal basis ex officio, it is 
paramount, due to the principle of party autonomy and due process, that the parties are given an 
opportunity to comment. This requires the arbitrators to take a proactive approach and to communicate 
legal issues at  the earliest point possible to the parties. Should a legal issue still not arise until the 
deliberations (which may often be the case), the tribunal should not hesitate to reopen the proceedings 
if it considers it necessary to raise the new legal issue or to cite the new legal source. Considerations of 
impartiality requires the arbitrators to be cautious not to present  arguments in either direction or reveal 
where it stands on issues in dispute when inviting the parties to comment. The parties should therefore 
simply  be asked to comment on the legal rule, alternative qualification of facts, or source, that the 
arbitral tribunal considers relevant, without the tribunal elaborating in either direction. Even though 
some commentators will protest to such case management, it is more important that the parties are not 
taken by surprise and that the arbitral award and its reasoning is understood by the parties. This will 
likely increase the acceptance of the award and make challenge actions less probable. The parties’ right 
to comment on points of law ensures procedural fairness and cannot be disregarded in international 
arbitration in Sweden, doing so can, as we have seen, constitute grounds for setting aside the award.
However, all dispute resolution – including arbitration – includes compromises between fairness and 
efficiency. Such a compromise in favor or efficiency  is that the arbitral tribunal’s own legal reasoning, 
interpretations of legal sources invoked, and legal sources raised ex officio that do not go meaningfully 
beyond the ones invoked by the parties need not be subject to contradictory debates.
Finally, it goes without saying that if the arbitral tribunal is aware of an applicable legal basis that 
requires new claims to be made or new fact to be invoked, it falls outside the scope of the arbitral 
tribunal’s mission to consider it.
60
5.1 Final remarks
The efficiency of international arbitration in general, and the competitiveness of Sweden as an arbitral 
seat in particular, requires a predicable arbitral procedure, acceptable to actors from different legal 
traditions. The uncertainty of how the law should be ascertained and applied in international 
commercial arbitration in Sweden is therefore not just a source of uncertainty for the parties to a 
particular dispute but also a competitive disadvantage for Sweden as an arbitral seat.
The recommendation presented in this thesis fulfills the requirements of offering predictability and of 
being acceptable to actors from different legal cultures, it  is also compatible with the principles 
governing Swedish arbitration law. The arbitral procedure must be predictable, but must also remain 
supple and flexible. It is therefore important to keep in mind, and it takes repeating, that the 
recommendation in this thesis only is meant as a recommendation, subordinate – of course to the will 
of the parties, but also – to circumstances of each particular case, which may justify deviations, made 
in a transparent manner.
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